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ERIC J.

SCHMERTZ
275

MADISON AVENUE

NEW YORK, NEW YORK I OO I 6- I I O I
(2 I 2) -455-9555
FAX: (2 I 2) 687-9O44
HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
HEMPSTEAD, NEW YORK I I 55O
(5 I 6) 463-587O

March 17, 1995

James A. Brown, Esq.
Colleran, O'Hara & Mills
1225 Franklin Avenue, Suite 450
Garden City, New York 11530
Joseph S. Rosenthal, Esq.
Bondy & Schloss
6 East 43rd Street
New York, New York 10017
Re:

TWU Local 100 -and- New York Bus Service
(My Award: David C. Edwards

Gentlemen:
This is in response to Mr. Brown's letter of March 3,
1995, and following my discussions with the parties on March 13th.
It was the intent of my Award in the above matter and I
so ordered, that Mr. Edwards be reinstated to a non-operating job.
The only job classification in that category is a cleaner. His
present assignment to a cleaner job is in compliance with my Award.
I do not have the authority to require the Company to
carry an employee above the compliment it needs, and it was not the
intent of my Award to require the Company to do so.
I had expected that Edwards' reinstatement would follow
the arrangements made to comply with my Awards in the cases of
Farmer, Belfone, Spacek and Spink.
However, it now is revealed that the implementation of
those four decisions cannot serve as precedent for the Edwards'
reinstatement. Unlike these four, the Edwards reinstatement was
not "absorbed" within the work force. Instead, it resulted in the
layoff of the most junior cleaner in order to make room for
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Edwards.
In short, the Company did not need the extra cleaner
resulting from Edwards' introduction into that classification, and
hence laid off the junior cleaner, Ms. Dhanwattie Sukhram, to
maintain its compliment of cleaners at the level needed.
In the Farmer case, there was an open cleaner job into
which he was placed. In the Belfone case, he waited a few weeks
until an opening became available. In the cases of Spacek and
Spink. their reinstatements were negotiated by the parties as part
of a strike settlement.
Only in the Edwards case has a layoff
resulted from the ordered reinstatement, and only in the Edwards
case was a layoff necessary to maintain the crew compliment needed.
Under all the foregoing circumstances, I have decided
that implementation of the Edwards Award shall be deemed as a
demotion of Edwards from bus operator to cleaner. As a demotion,
seniority shall prevail in filling the available jobs. As Edwards
has greater seniority, his reinstatement to the cleaner job has the
contractual effect of displacing a cleaner with less seniority —
in this case, Ms. Sukhram.
As the cleaner last laid off, Ms. Sukhram shall be the
first recalled to a cleaner job when and if an opening occurs. She
is also entitled to unemployment insurance, which I understand she
is receiving.
Very trjjtly yours,

Eric J/f Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
EJS/ps

//

N, O'HARA& MILLS
225 F R A N K L I N AVENUE , S U I T E 450
GARDEN CITY, NEW YORK 11530

M. COLLERAN (RETIRED)

RICHARD L. O'HARA
JOHN F. MILLS
EDWARD J. GROARKE
CHRISTOPHER P. O'HARA

51O 248-5757
21 S 6 1 4 - 9 1 1 9

SCOTT P. SHELKIX
CAROL L. O ' R C H R K L
JAMES A. BROWN
J E N N I F E R MILLS B E R L . I N G I E K I
•JOHN \V. D U N N E

March 3, 1995

STEPHANIE SUAREZ (PARALEGAL)
ROBIN A. YOLNG (PARALE^AI.)
MADELEINE OLACIREGUI (PARALEGAL)
ANN M. CAROI.AN (PARALEGAL)

Rivkin, Radler & Kremer
Eric Schmertz
215 Madison Avenue
38th Floor
Hew York, New York 10016
Re:

Bavid C, Edwards

Dear Mr. Schmertz :
With regard to your recent. Arbitration Award in the
above-captioned matter, please be advised that pursuant to your
Award, Mr. Edwards was placed in a non-safety sensitive position
but at. the expense of another bargaining unit member, Dhanwattie
Sukhram, who was summarily laid off.
As your Award clearly
contemplates that Mr. Edwards' demotion will be only temporary,
Local 100 submits that the Company's lay off is purely
retaliatory.
As further evidence of the Company's retaliatory
motive, Company representatives have stated to employees that
the Union can be blamed for Ms. Sukhram 's termination.
In the past., the Company has absorbed
the employee
temporarily demoted under similar conditions without any impact
of the rest of the bargaining unit.
See the Ivan Bel rone
and Antoine Farmer cases.
The Company's lay off clearly
violates the spirit of your Award.
/
As
a
consequence
of
the
Company's
action, we
Respectfully petition the arbitrator to restore Mr. Edwards to
his bus operator title and job duties without any further delay.
Yours truly,
COLLERAN, 0 ' HAEA & MILLS
By:

JAMES A. BROWN

JABrmk
cc:

James Hood
Swainson Gill
Joseph Rosenthal, Esq.

V4I*'

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TWUA
-and- NEW YORK BUS SERVICE

In the matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 100 Transport Workers Union
of America, AFL-CIO

:
:

OPINION AND AWARD

•
•

and

:
•
•

New York Bus Service

:

The stipulated issue is:
Whether there was just cause for the termination of David C. Edwards. If not, what shall
be the remedy?
A hearing was held on November 18, 1994 at which time Mr.
Edwards, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives
of the above-named Union and Company appeared. All concerned were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived; a

stenographic record of the hearing was taken; and the parties filed posthearing briefs.

The pertinent contract provision is Article 33, Paragraph Third,
which reads:

-2-

"If it is determined through appropriate medical
tests that the employee was under the influence
of alcohol during working hours...such employee
shall be subject to immediate discharge."

As noted in previous decisions, the contract does not bar
consumption of alcohol outside of working hours. Nor does it bar every
quantity of blood alcohol during working hours. Rather it bars a quantity
that equates with "being under the influence of alcohol during working
hours."
The grievant began his shift as a driver on August 1, 1994 at 7:45
A.M. At about 8:20 A.M. he was involved in an accident. 1

It is undisputed that under the cirumstances of this accident the
Company had a legitimate reason to have the grievant tested for alcohol
and drug use.

The grievant was so tested at about 11:15 A.M. that day at Our Lady
of Mercy Hospital. The test reported an alcohol level in his blood of 0.025
g/dl.
The Company acknowledges that a blood alcohol content of 0.025 is
not up to the statutory or medically recognized level of "intoxication or
impairment."

However, it argues that at the medically accepted rate that

iThe nature of the accident and the question of fault is not material
to this case. The Company has stipulated that the accident was not the
reason for this discharge.

-3-

the human body disposes of alcohol in the blood (i.e. .02 BAG per hour) the
grievant must have had a blood alcohol content when he started work that
day at 7:45 A.M. of .075. A .075 alcohol content, asserts the Company,
constitutes "driving while ability impaired by alcohol (DWAI)" in violation
of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law Sees. 1192.2, and 1195.2(b)2

Additionally, the Company argues that based on the foregoing
analysis the grievant must have consumed alcohol "within six hours
before going on duty," in violation of Article 19A Section 509.1 of the
Vehicle and Traffic Law, expressly applicable to "a motor vehicle...transporting the public at large."

From these assertion, the Company concludes that the grievant was

2The relevant stature provisions reads:
"Evidence that there was more than .07 of one
per centrum but less than .10 of one per centrum
by weight of alcohol in such person's blood shall
be prima facie evidence that sue h person was not
in an intoxicated condition, but such evidence shall
be given prima facie effect in determining whether
the ability of such person to operate a motor vehicle
was impaired by the consumption of alcohol"; and
"...no person shall operate a motor vehicle while the
person's ability to operate such motor vehicle is
impaired by the consumption of alcohol."

-4-

"under the influence of alcohol during working hours" within the meaning
of Article 33 of the collective bargaining agreement.

My definition of the contract language "under the influence" as
expressed in prior decisions is not materially different from the Motor
Vehicle Law.

In the case involving Peter Spacek and William Spink (Award of
October 24, 1983) I stated:

"Under the influence" means to me a use...in
sufficient quantity to impair senses, reflexes,
alertness and judgement or to alter ones
physical or psychological demeanor thereby
adversely affecting the normal ability to drive
a bus safely." (emphasis added)

Though the Spacek and Spink case involved the use of marijuana,
my definition of "under the influence" was and is the same for alcohol,
and in material respect coincides with the statutory definition.

However, the further reliance by the Union on the Spacek and Spink
case is misplaced.3 I did not find Spacek and Spink "under the influence"
of marijuana because, as I stated:

3The same limitation applies to the decision
involving Evan Belfone (March 18, 1985).

-5-

"The expert testimony and authoritative writings
...regarding the effect on reflexes, demeanor,
senses and judgement from (marijuana) are conflicting, indeterminative and hence inconclusive."
In short, I held that because there is no statutory level or quantity of
marijuana use that constitutes "impairment" and because the medical
authorities are not in agreement, I could not find "impairment" or "under
the influence" from the quantity of marijuana found in the blood of Spacek
and Spink.

But alcohol use is different.

Indeed, I recognized that in the Spacek

and Spink case, when I stated:

"Like an alcohol content of less than statutorilv
recognized level of impairment. I cannot conclude that the foregoing levels of...marijuana...
in the grievants' blood were sufficient to cause
impairment or being under the influence,
(emphasis added)
Unlike marijuana there is a presumptive statutorily recognized level
of "impairment" from alcohol use. It is, as the motor vehicle law
provides, a blood alcohol content of more than .07.

As I have repeatedly stated in many decisions, the Company has a
fiduciary duty to provide safe transportation for the riding public it

-6-

serves.

Consequently its drivers bear a special responsibility not to drive

under any condition of physical or mental "impairment" and must comply
with the applicable motor vehicle laws in that regard as well as the
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.

Hence, by holdings in prior cases and because of the Company's
special duty, I take arbitral notice of the aforesaid cited provisions of the
motor vehical law as applicable to the grievant and applicable to
determining the meaning of "being under the influence" within the meaning of the contract. I am satisfied that the relevant motor vehicle laws
were known or made known to the Company's employees including the
grievant.

In short then, if the grievant reported for work with 0.075 blood
alcohol content, he was "under the influence of alcohol during working
hours" as proscribed by the contract.

The critical question, therefore, is whether the period of time from
when the grievant reported to work to the later time when his blood test
showed 0.025 alcohol content can be retroactively calculated on a reverse
hourly basis to produce and show a level of 0.075 when he started work.

Though the Company did not introduce in-person medical testimony

-7-

to show the rate of disposal of alcohol at .02 per hour, I am satisfied that
that formula should be presumptively accepted, at least prima facie,
subject to evidentiary rebuttal. The Driver's Manual of the Department of
Motor Vehicles (Company Exhibit #4) states that:

"Each...drink(s) (1 glass of wine or 1 ounce of whiskey
or 1 can of beer) contains enough alcohol to
increase your BAG by about .02 percent. Your
body can usually dispose of that much alcohol
in about one hour."

I am prepared to accept that statement from the Department of Motor
Vehicles, as authoritative and accurate, prima facie. I recognize that it
conditions its statement with the phrases "usually dispose" and
"in about an hour (emphasis added). But those are the factors to which
rebuttal evidence should be directed. The Union's questioning of the
accuracy of .02 disposal rate to the grievant, because of his weight of 128
pounds, is not enough to meet the rebuttal test. Also, that he may not have
shown impairment symptoms at the time of the accident is not
determinative of his alcohol content when he started work. On this basis it
is logical to conclude that the Company has shown that when the grievant
reported for duty at 7:45 A.M. on August 1, 1994, his blood contained an
alcohol content of more than .07.

But even under the laws cited by the Company, that content of blood

-8alcohol is not synonymous with "impairment," absolutely or irrebuttably.

Section 1195 2(c) states inter alia, that more than .07..."shall be
given prima facie effect in determining whether the ability...to operate a
motore vehicle was impaired by the "consumption of alcohol" (emphasis
added).

So, the grievant's .075 is not conclusive, it is only prima facie, or
rebuttably presumptive evidence of impairment. That means that the
burden in this case shifted to the grievant to rebut the presumption of
impairment.

His effort to do so was most unpersuasive. He acknowledged
drinking a few beers, but denies that he did so within six hours before
reporting for work. He claims instead that in the morning at about 6:00
A.M. after awakening, he consumed an undisclosed amount of NyQuil
because he had a cold and felt some nose congestion. Frankly, I cannot
accept this testimony. I am sure that the grievant knows that NyQuil is to
be taken at night, not in the morning, and that it can cause drowsiness.
Simply, I do not believe he would have taken it that morning. Moreover, at
an earlier proceeding involving the accident he denied being on or taking
any medication, and did not make the NyQuil claim until the second step of
the grievance procedure. Also, if he used NyQuil, he had the burden of
showing that he used enough to account for the blood alcohol content found

-9and calculated. He has not done so, and I doubt he could. I must conclude
therefore that his claimed use of NyQuil is a contrived effort to a avoid
responsibility for the consumption of alcohol and for "being under its
influence" during prohibited times.

The foregoing notwithstanding, there are two reasons why I conclude
that the penalty should be severe, but short of discharge.

First, the grievant has been with the Company about ten years, and
the record in this case shows no prior relevant discipline.

Second, and more important is my recognition that, factually, the
grievant's body metabolism may have a slower disposal rate than .02 per
hour. Though he failed to rebut the presumptions I accorded to that rate
and to the presumption of "impairment," I think it reasonably possible
that his blood alcohol content at the beginning of his shift may have been
.07 or less if his disposal rate is slower than the "usual" .02 and if it
takes him longer than "about" an hour to achieve that disposal.

As there is a small difference between .07 (which falls short of
impairment) and .075 (which constitutes impairment), I am troubled by
the lack of precise medical information regarding the grievant's disposal
rate, and I am reluctant to affirm his loss of employment on that small
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differential and because a technical rebuttal burden has not been met.

More specifically, if his blood alcohol content was .07 or less when
he began work (based on a slower disposal rate) he would not have been
discharged and his specious defense (for which I sharply criticize him)
would not have been raised.

In short, my conclusion is that he drank alcohol during the six hours
before his shift, but that the quantity may not have been enough to raise
his blood alcohol content beyond the 0.07 level when he began to work.

Applying the foregoing theory leaves the grievant in a position
analagous to Spacek, Spink and Belfone. He violated the Motor Vehicle Law
by drinking within six hours of reporting to duty. Based on legal
presumptions and prima facie evidence, his blood alcohol content at the
beginning of his shift constituted "impairment."

Yet, setting legal

presumptions aside, there is the medical possibility that this blood
alcohol content was below the "impairment level."

With these imponderables, I am constrained to impose the same
penalty imposed on Spacek,. Spink and Belfone.

Accordingly, the Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the

-1 1-

-11collective bargaining agreement between the above-named parties, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the
following AWARD:

The discharge of David C. Edwards is reduced to
a disciplinary suspension. He shall be reinstated,
but without back pay, with the period from his
discharge to his reinstatement deemed the disciplinary suspension. In recognition of the Company's
overriding duty to provide safe transportation, the
grievant shall be barred from working as a bus
driver. His reinstatement shall be to a non-operating
job at the rate of pay of that non-operating job.
After the passage of some time and consistent with
the provisions of the contract and any proper rules
that may then be in effect, the Union may petition the
Impartial Chairman to consider restoring Edwards to
an operating job as a bus driver.

DATED: February 17, 1995
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )ss:

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Impartial
Chairman that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

MPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TWUA -andEW YORK BUS SERVICE
x

N THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
OCAL 100 TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
)F AMERICA

(Virgilio Irizarry)

-and-

TEW YORK BUS SERVICE

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of Virgilio
Irizarry?

If not, what shall be the remedy?

A hearing was held on March 13, 1995 at which time Mr. Irizarry,
lereinafter referred

to as the "grievant" and representatives

of the

ibove-named Union and Employer appeared. All concerned were afforded full
>pportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crosssxamine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The grievant, a bus operator, was discharged for being involved
Ln several accidents, some chargeable and some not chargeable, over the
bwo years and two months of his employment.
Neither the grievant nor the Union disputes the occurrences of
:he accidents nor the "chargeability" of these so identified.
The

grievant's

discharge

was

triggered

by

two chargeable

iccidents respectively on November 31 and December 13, 1994, following a
:wo day suspension and a warning imposed on the grievant on May 26, 1994

or his involvement in earlier accidents.

The two day suspension and

earning was not protested or challenged by the grievant or the Union.

In

the absence of any such challenge, I must deem that the earlier accidents,
chargeable or non-chargeable, constituted just cause for the two day
suspension and warning.
Against the back drop of that suspension and warning, the issue
narrows

to

whether

the

two

subsequent

accidents,

incontestably

•chargeable," constituted cause for the grievant's dismissal.
I

am

confident

that

the parties

recognize

that

in prior

decisions, I have given the highest priority to the requirement that bus
operators perform their driving duties safely and in strict compliance
applicable motor vehicle regulations and the Employer's rules and
regulations.

I have repeatedly referred to the Employer's obligations in

that regard as a "fiduciary duty" to the public and I have upheld the
lischarge of bus operators whom I have deemed "accident prone" as well as
those who have been responsible for unsafe operating practices and/or
insafe or impaired conditions personally.
I have no intention to compromise or alter that line of arbitral
rulings.

But the facts of the instant case fall somewhat short of the

Level of those rulings.
There is no claim that the grievant was impaired.

There is no

that he displayed recklessness or flagrantly violated any particular
jperating rule of safety.

There is no claim that the two accidents

ubsequent to his suspension were serious or caused substantial damage.
They were accidents for which he was a fault, but they were minor and
no one's safety was in jeopardy.

One involved "light" bumper to

mmper contact on the highway in heavy traffic at a very slow speed. From
:he accident report it appears that no passengers were aboard.

The other

/as in the Employer's yard when the grievant backed into another vehicle
/hile attempting to park a MIU, causing some bumper damage.

Again, no

assengers were aboard either vehicle.
I do not excuse the grievant from these accidents.

But I am not

ersuaded that they evidenced a degree of negligence, disregard of safety,
or, as yet, a relevant "accident-proneness" that, at this point warrants
his discharge.

He is perilously close to the point of dismissal.

And a

failure to avoid future accidents would assuredly put him into a class
that would make his continued employment "too-risky."
But, considering the nature of the last two accidents and the
grievant's statement at the hearing that he recognizes his mistakes and
feels confident he can do the job if given a final opportunity, I have
decided to give him that last chance.
Also, I note that the warning that went along with the two day
suspension

stated

that

"future

termination" (emphasis added).

chargeable

accidents

may

result

in

By not stating that future accident will

or shall result in discharge, the grievant's dismissal was not mandated or
lutomatically required.
lature

of

any

future

The warning allowed for consideration of the
chargeable

accidents,

and

also

allowed

onsideration of whether the grievant could still be rehabilitated.
think he can.

for
I

Accordingly,
collective

the Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the

bargaining agreement between the above-named parties, and

laving duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the
ollowing Award:
The discharge of Virgilio Irizarry is reduced to a
disciplinary suspension.
without back pay.

He shall be reinstated but

The period between his discharge

and his reinstatement shall be deemed a disciplinary
suspension
November
subject

for

the

two

chargeable

31 and December 13,
to

re-training

Employer's discretion.

by

1994.

the

accidents

He shall be

Employer

at

He is warned that

chargeable accidents or accidents that
"accident-proneness"

would

be

of

grounds

the

future

constitute
for

his

discharge.

Eric J. Schmertz, Impartial Chairman

)ATED:

March 17, 1995

TATE OF NEW YORK

)

:OUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Impartial
-hairman that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT
WORKERS UNION -AND- NEW YORK BUS SERVICE
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
,OCAL 100, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION

OPINION AND AWARD

and
JEW YORK BUS SERVICE
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of VICTOR
EARTHMAN?

If not, what shall be the remedy?

Hearings were held on May 12 and June 14, 1995 at which time
. Earthman, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and
representatives of the above-named Employer and Union appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

waived.
The grievant, a bus operator, was discharged for leaving his bus
on duty and in traffic; for assaulting a cab driver by punching
him in the face; and for displaying a knife to the cab driver,
threateningly.
The facts in support of the elements of the foregoing charges
against the grievant were testified to by a witness who was a passenger
in the cab at the time of the incident.

I accept his testimony as

omplete and accurate.
The grievant admits the charges and apologizes.
I find that he is contrite and profoundly sorry for what he
lid.

He knows he reacted wrongfully and in an extremely inexcusable

manner.

As a long-term employee with an otherwise good record, I

onclude that this, his first offense of this type, was out of
character, and considering his contriteness, will not reoccur.

I find

that he knows not only that his behavior was totally unacceptable,
regardless of the provocation, and that if given another chance he will
comply with all the rules of the Employer and the standards of conduct
expected of a driver of a bus that services the public.
I shall give him that chance.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above-named parties, and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the following
AWARD:
The discharge of Victor Earthman is reduced to a
suspension.
He shall be reinstated but without back pay.

The

period of time from his discharge to his
reinstatement shall be deemed a disciplinary
suspension for his acts of misconduct.
He is warned that future relevant charges, if
sustained, will result in his discharge.

Eric j/. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED:

June 14, 1995

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Impartial
Chairman that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.
(
<£*•'
si

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT
WORKERS UNION -AND- NEW YORK BUS SERVICE
x

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OCAL 100, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION

OPINION AND AWARD

and

JEW YORK BUS SERVICE
-X

The stipulated issues are:
Was there just cause for the discharge of CLARENCE
STEVENSON?

If not, what shall be the remedy?

Was there

just cause for the discharge of LYNVAL

MULLINGS?

If not, what shall be the remedy?

A hearing was held on July 17, 1995 at which time Mr. Stevenson,
lereinafter referred to as "Stevenson" and Mr. Mullings, hereinafter
referred to as "Mullings" and representative of the above-named Union and
mployer appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

CLARENCE STEVENSON
Stevenson, a bus operator was discharged for his involvement in
even

"chargeable"

accidents

from

September

1993,

employment to June 9, 1995 when he was dismissed.

the

date

of his

He had been previously

lisciplined for his accident record, and other offense(s) with a one-day
5uspension in October 1994 and a five-day suspension in December 1994.

The accidents that "triggered" his discharge occurred on June 2
and June 5, 1995.
On June 2nd, he stopped
passenger to fall in the aisle.

his bus abruptly,

causing a child

The child was not injured.

he struck a parked car while making a right turn.

On June 5th,

The car suffered some

bumper damage.
Because there were no injuries or significant damage, either or
both

of these

discharge.

accidents,

standing

alone, would

not

be

grounds for

The question in the instant case is whether either or both

accidents together with five prior chargeable accidents and following
earlier disciplinary suspensions, constitutes, cumulatively, grounds for
dismissal.
The grievant's five prior "chargeable" accidents are relevant.
The Union is wrong in its argument that because he was disciplined for
them by suspensions, they may not be considered in determining whether he
was discharged for cause.

It is well-settled that a cumulative record of

offenses may be included in the reasons for the ultimate penalty of
dismissal, provided the employee, as here, has been subjected to lesser
progressive discipline penalties along the way.
would

not

only preclude

resort

to an entire

The Union's argument
record

of offenses or

mistakes, but more significantly, would nullify the use and application of
progressive discipline as the foundation of the final disciplinary step of
discharge.

Here Stevenson was discharged for his overall accident record.

The Level Two Decision reads in pertinent part:
"Stevenson has continually been involved in accidents
with

stationary

objects,

and while making

turns.

Prior discipline and retraining have not corrected his
problems in these areas..."

The five earlier accidents were on December 20, 1993 when he
backed into an auto; on March 29, 1994 when he hit a post and while making
a right turn; on September 9, 1994 when he struck a dumpster; on September
29, 1994 when he struck a tree branch and on November 22, 1994 when he hit
a pole while making a right turn.
Admittedly,
serious.

none

of these

accidents,

standing

alone, were

However, they present a serious and precarious pattern.

Too

many accidents occurred within the relatively short period of time of his
employment.
I have repeatedly held that in compliance with its "fiduciary"
duty to the riding public to provide safe transportation, the Employer may
sever

from its payroll drivers who show a propensity

for chargeable

accidents where, as here, the accumulation of these accidents takes place
within a frequent period of time, and where, as here, because they have
continued after counselling and discipline, indicate a potentially chronic
inability

to

drive

carefully

and

safety.

As

I stated

in earlier

decisions, where an accident record has reached that point, where the
chance of its continuation in the future remains apparent, the Employer is
not required to wait until there is a major accident or serious damage or
injury before it can remove the offending driver from its employ.
Here, regretfully, I find the grievant's record to have reached
the point of "no return."
included a "final warning."

His five-day suspension

in December 1994

It had been a discharge, but on the Union's

appeal to the Employer it was reduced to a five-day suspension.

I am

satisfied that with his reinstatement, Stevenson and the Union were told
or

knew

that

"any

in...termina(tion)."

future

chargeable

accidents...may

result

A future chargeable accidents took place on June

5th, thereby constituting a breach of the final chance given Stevenson by

'•

the Employer when it responded to the Union's appeal and reduced the
earlier discharge to a five-day suspension.1
In sum, as a short-term employee, it appears that Stevenson has
not learned to drive a bus satisfactorily, and at this point represents a
risk to the Employer and to the riding public if continued at work. Under
that circumstance, I find just cause for his discharge.

LYNVAL MULLINGS
According

to

the

Employer, Mullings, a bus

discharged for "repeated violations of Company rules."

operator, was

It points out that

in February 1991 he was suspended three days for "not checking his bus
after a run" and that that offense resulted in leaving a child on the bus
unattended for six hours.

Later in 1991 he was suspended seven days for

'violation of the 'no strike' clause of the contract," (as adjudicated in
an arbitration).

Also, the Employer points to repeated warnings given

Mullings for "poor attendance."
The foregoing culminated, asserts the Employer, by the event
which "triggered" his discharge —

namely that on May 24, 1995, Mullings

fell asleep at the wheel of his bus while stopped at a traffic light
shortly after he started his regular run.

The Employer argues that the

obvious and inherent danger to passengers, to other vehicles and to the
operator by falling asleep at the wheel while engaged in operating the
bus,

together

with his prior disciplinary record, warrants Mullings'

discharge.

'Though not determinative in this Decision, I am not satisfied
that the June 2nd accident was "chargeable."
The grievant's
unrefuted testimony is that he stopped the bus to avoid "hitting a
cat." That is plausible and not a driving error. And the child
that fell in the aisle had disregarded repeated instructions to
remain in his seat while the bus was underway, and hence,
contributed to the incident.

The Union contends that the Employer is confined to the charge
against Mullings of falling asleep at the wheel, and may not in this
proceeding make reference to or rely on his prior disciplinary record as
jart of the grounds for discharge.

The Union's position is two fold.

First it asserts that because Mullings was previously disciplined for
those prior offenses, they no longer are viable grounds to be considered
in judging the propriety of the discharge.
Employer's notice of the discharge

And secondly, because the

the Union and Mullings

limits the

reason for the discharge to the charge of falling asleep behind the wheel
of his bus.
The first argument of the Union I have answered and rejected in
my opinion on the discharge of Stevenson, and need not be repeated here.
The second argument I reject also, but confined to this case.
I am not prepared to treat the Level Two Decision as a "common law
pleading."

As a Level Two Decision it was responsive to the circumstance

immediately present at the time of Mullings' discharge —
falling asleep at the wheel.

namely his

It responded factually to whether Mullings

was asleep and the surrounding facts regarding Mullings' "second job" and
the medication he claims he took.

Apparently, not part of the immediate

discussion was Mullings' prior disciplinary record.

But, in my view, that

does not mean that the Company's reasons for discharging Mullings did not
include consideration and evaluation of his prior record in addition to
the last incident.

And therefore, it does not mean that the Employer, in

meeting its burden of establishing just cause for the discharge, cannot,
in this arbitration, call attention to and rely on Mullings' overall
disciplinary record cumulatively.
This

is not to say that there may not be cases where the

Employer discharges an employee for a single, immediate offense without

consideration of or reliance on a prior record.

If the case establishes

that single reason for the discharge, I would not and have not allowed the
Employer

to

"boot-strap"

his decision by later reliance

on a prior

disciplinary record when that record was not the reason or among the
reasons for the discharge at the time the discharge was imposed.
do

not

see the

instant

case to be one of

"boot-strapping."

But, I
I am

satisfied, based on the testimony and record, that in considering the
unsafe aspects of "falling asleep behind the wheel of his bus during the
course

of his route," the Employer looked at Mullings prior record,

including his three-day and seven-day suspensions and his warnings for
attendance problems, and decided that cumulatively that record justified
dismissal.
I am constrained to agree. The final offense of falling asleep,
rfhich is not seriously disputed by either the Union or Mullings, is not
only

fraught with

obvious dangers, but constitutes a second

act of

irresponsibility on his part (the first was his violation of the contract
'no strike" clause).

He has explanations which are not excuses.

That he

may have taken medication that causes drowsiness for his allergies when he
knew

he

would

be

operating

a passenger

vehicle

is

an

example of

carelessness. But clearly more serious and irresponsible is his admission
that he had maintained a second job delivering newspapers which required
him to work from 3:00 A.M. each day immediately before he began his bus
run at 6:45 A.M.; that as a result he got less than an adequate night's
sleep; and that he had kept that obviously fatiguing schedule for several
months.

Also he admits that he was "up late" the night before the

incident and also was up to deliver the newspapers.

I conclude that it

was his second job that caused the fatigue or significantly contributed to
the fatigue which led to falling asleep at the wheel of the bus.

This circumstance is a classical example of how and why "second
jobs" are viewed as in conflict with an employee's primary job and primary
responsibility.

That Mullings may have needed the extra compensation does

not excuse him from engaging in a course of conduct that has profound
potential for injury to himself and others.2
Under

all the foregoing

facts, I cannot

conclude that the

Employer's decision to discharge Mullings was unreasonable

or unduly

harsh.
The

Undersigned,

Impartial

Chairman

under

the

collective

bargaining agreement between the above-named parties, and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the following
AWARDS:
The discharge of CLARENCE STEVENSON was

for just

cause.

The discharge of LYNVAL MULLINGS was for just cause.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED:

July 27, 1995

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Impartial
Chairman that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

2That at the time he fell asleep there were no passengers
yet in the bus was fortunate, but is not a mitigating
circumstance. He had just started his run and was to and did
pick up three passengers at the next stop, before being removed
from service. Obviously, had he fallen asleep after that stop,
those passengers would have been endangered.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TWUA -andYORK BUS SERVICE
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO
-andTEW YORK BUS SERVICE

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of DAVID C.
EDWARDS.

If not, what shall be the remedy?

Hearing were held on September 18 and November 1, 1995 at which
time

Mr.

Edwards,

representatives

hereinafter

referred

to

as

the

"grievant"

of the above-named Union and Employer appeared.

and
All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

waived.
The evidence clearly establishes that the grievant was unable or
unwilling to satisfactorily

perform his duties as a Cleaner.

More

specifically, though he cleaned MIU vehicles satisfactorily, he performed
lis cleaning duties on regular school buses poorly.
the latter was not measured in isolation.
joth

women,

carried

out

the

identical

His performance on

Rather, the other two Cleaners,
duties

on

the

school

atisfactorily, and the grievant's work was compared to them.

buses

It appears, based on the record, that when the annual cleaning
of school buses was assigned to the Cleaners, along with their regular and
more often cleaning of MIU's, the women adjusted

to the assignment,

leaned the gum and other matter from the school bus floors and did other
xtensive cleaning of the bus walls and ceilings.
not or did not do so.

But the grievant could

The unrefuted testimony is that the school buses

assigned to the grievant for cleaning were "as dirty after he worked on
hem as before."

And that the condition of the buses assigned to him

remained the same even after the Employer, at the request of the Cleaners,
educed the number of buses to clean each day from three to two.
The grievant does not deny this testimony.
that he "did the best he could."

His explanation is

I interpret that as an acknowledgement

that he could not or would not do better.

That acknowledgement serves to

-ebut the Union's contention that the Employer brought the charges against
aim as retaliation for his request that he be restored to the position of
bus operator.

In short, by acknowledging that the unsatisfactory nature

of his work was "the best he could do," the Employer's complaint about
that work can not be deemed as contrived, falsified or retaliatory.
On the other hand, I do not view the grievant's statement that
e "did the best he could" as insubordination.

So, any reliance by the

mployer on a charge of insubordination is misplaced, and has not been
proved.
Yet, there remains both the proven fact that the grievant did
lot

or

could

not

perform

his

duties

as

a Cleaner

of

school

buses

satisfactorily, and an acknowledgement which I have judged to mean that he
ould not or would not be able to improve his work to a satisfactory
evel, if he was returned to that job.
employment as a Cleaner.

Hence, I find no basis for his re-

The solution is not to restore the grievant to a bus operator
ob. Under that circumstance and under the circumstances which caused his
emoval from the operator job, he has not earned restoration.

To grant

is appeal for restoration to operator would be to reward him for failing
s a Cleaner.
If this was an ordinary case of inability or unwillingness to
erform job duties satisfactorily, the grievant would be entitled to a
progressive discipline" penalty before the summary penalty of discharge,
f this was an ordinary case, I would suspend him and warn him that his
ob was

in jeopardy unless he

improved his work

as a Cleaner to a

atisfactory level.
But this is not an ordinary case.

The grievant was demoted to

leaner by my arbitration Award which upheld his removal from driving.

I

lid not uphold his discharge even though he failed to rebut the Employer's
jrima facie case that he was driving a bus while statutorily under the
nfluence of alcohol.

I did not upheld his discharge then because I

reasoned that there may have been some scientific basis to conclude that
iis alcohol content was slightly less than the statutory level of "under
bhe influence."
idvanced

And that because that scientific possibility was not

as rebuttal

evidence, I would give him a chance to remain

employed, but in a non-operating capacity, and with an opportunity in the
future to appeal for restoration to driving.
The conditions inherent in my Award are and were obvious.

As

lis employment restoration to a non-operating job was without back pay and
expressly characterized by me as a "disciplinary suspension," his

ssignment to the job of Cleaner, in compliance with my Award, constituted
"chance" following a disciplinary suspension

to prove himself as a

atisfactorily employee albeit in the Cleaner classification. And on that
asis that chance was obviously a "final chance."
Equally obvious and attendant thereto was the requirement that
e perform the Cleaner job satisfactorily and that a failure to do so
ould

subject

him, not

to

a preliminary

step

in the

"progressive

iscipline" sequence, but to dismissal.
In short, he had the benefit of progressive discipline when his
riginal discharge was reduced to a disciplinary suspension.

The instant

charge against him places him at the final step of discipline, namely
discharge.
This conclusion is further supported by a fact known to both
arties and to the grievant.
lad to layoff one Cleaner.

To comply with my prior Award, the Employer
I sanctioned that layoff to accommodate the

chance" I was according the grievant.

As I see it, and put another way,

in innocent Cleaner lost her job to make room for the grievant.

Clearly

bhen, the grievant knew or should have known that he was given not just a
chance" but a "final chance."

His reinstatement now would cause the

Layoff a second time of the Cleaner originally affected.
ustification for causing that consequence again.
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I see no

The

Undersigned

Impartial

Chairman

under

the

Collective

argaining Agreement between the above-named parties, and having duly
eard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the following
WARD:
There was just cause for the discharge of David C.
Edwards .
__

Eric J^ Schmertz, Impartial Chairman

lATED:

November 10, 1995

TATE OF NEW YORK

)

:OUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Impartial
:hairman that I am the individual described in and who executed this
nstrument, which is my AWARD.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
[LOCAL 3 I . B . E . W .
and

STY CABLE CHOICE TV,

INC.
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Was the discharge of AMSLEY GORDON for just cause?

If

not, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on July 6, 1995 at the offices of the New
York State Employment Relations Board in New York City at which time Mr.
Gordon, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of
the above-named Union and Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded

full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The parties filed

post-hearing briefs.
The discharge of the grievant is based on the charge against him
that he "facilitated an illegal transaction."1
The Company experienced substantial thefts of its equipment,
particularly its cable box from and through which subscribers received the
Company's TV signal.

Of the estimated 46,000 recipients of the Company's

TV signal, it is estimated that some 23,000 received the TV signal from a
"black market" cable box, and hence obtained the Company's TV product
without subscription payment.

*In its brief, but not at the hearing, the Company charged
the grievant with "disloyalty." That is a significantly
different charge than "facilitating an illegal transaction." As
the charge of "disloyalty" was not raised or litigated at the
hearing, I cannot consider it.

Suspecting that some of its own employees were involved in the
thefts

of

cable

boxes

and/or

in

illegal

sales

of

the

boxes

and

transactions which compromised the Company's TV signal, the Company hired
an

investigative

agency

which placed

an undercover

agent

among the

employees to determine whether any employees were involved.
The agent engaged the grievant in a conversation. The following
undisputed exchange took place between them on February 24, 1995:2
MF:

Excuse me, How ya doing?

UM:

What's up.

MF:

I'm looking for a guy named Dave.

UM:

Dave? Dave?

MF:

Yeah

UM:

Dave, Dave, Dave, Dave. Describe him.

MF:

I don't know him. I was talking with another guy, Kevin.

UM:

Kevin?

MF:

Yes.

UM:

Is he a salesman or a technician?

MF:

Ail right well he's probably a tech

UM:

A box. Well it's kind of rough ya know?

MF:

Well if you know where I can hook one up and land one in a hurry, I got like Six
Hundred bucks man that I'm ready to....

UM:

We'll I'll tell you man, it's scary now, every guy, every man right now scared of
people, ya know what I mean ?. Cause they cut a few guys lose man, for the same
thing, selling a box, ya know man, so for you to j u s t , I mean, I don't know who
you are really...but for you to just walk ..

•

I was trying, I'm trying to find a box.

2The undercover agent is referred to as "MF."
grievant.

"UM" is the

MF:

No I hear you, I hear you man...

UM:

You know what I'm saying.

MF:

No, I know exactly what your saying.

UM:

Yo I'm telling you, sir, it's rough. But Umm , I know a guy though, he's a, they fired
him a couple of days ago. He's still hooking things up. You give me your number, I'll
give it to him, ya know?

MF:

O.K. Let me write this down.

UM:

Let me ask you again, you sure you're not the police?

MF:

No I'm definitely not no police man, I'm a musician man.

UM:

Musician, oh yeah? (inaudible) music.

MF:

463.. oh yeah..

(Operative hands Tony beeper number)
UM:

Oh that's your number7

MF:

Yeah that's the beeper number.

UM:

This?

MF:

Yeah.

UM:

All right.

MF:

That's a beeper number man.

UM:

All right. So where you living Mr.(inaudible), you living....

MF:

Well I'm living upstate but I work for, I work for the State of New York, I do all the
service like for all the Nursing Homes, homeless shelters..

UM:

Yeah.

MF:

And you know I'm hooking up with connections, cause a friend of mine got one for.

UM:

This is Upstate?

MF:

Yeah. I rehearse up there with my band.

UM:

O.K., you live in Brooklyn though?

MF:

Yeah. I'm staying at the Concord Nursing Home cause I work in, I work at all like
three or four different shelters.

UM:

O.K.

MF:

So I go from shelter to shelter doing recreation.

UM:

O.K.

MF:

So what I'm trying to do is, I'm talking to like some of the other recreation people
cause a friend of mine that works at Concord down here got one for his place.

UM:

Oh, O.K.

MF:

So that why I say, well shit, ya know hey, if he got one, maybe they can hook up a
couple in these places and I got..

UM:

Brooklyn is the best that to hook it up though. Ya know, out of state, (inaudible)
maybe it works upstate, I don't know.

MF:

No man, ya know they would definitely wouldn't work up there, ya know, I work in
the C-ity all the time, ya know that's...

UM:

Oh you reside, like I say, you reside in Brooklyn?

MF:

Yeah at the, yeah.

UM:

In this neighborhood it's good. This block here is good cause of the line of sight, ya
know. Transmitted from the Empire State building, ya know.

MF:

I'll tell you what man, if you, ya know, if your down man, I can get, we can make
some money.

UM:

Ah man.

MF:

Where you, the thing, you got the beeper number so if you can hook it up, if you can
hook it up, ya know I'll throw you like Two Hundred bucks on the side because I
work in like six different Nursing homes.

UM:

Yeah. All right, I'll let you know what's up. All right9

MF:

All right, my name is Joe by the way.

UM:

Joe9

MF:

Yeah.

UM:

All right.

MF:

What's yours 9

UM:

They call me Tony.

MF:

Tony 9

UM:

Tony

MF:

O.K. Tony

UM:

All right.

MF:

Cool man.

UM:

Yeah

It
statement

is

that

the

Company's

he was

position

"trying to find

that
a box

following
and had

transaction" for the grievant to state that he knew

the

agent's

$600

for the

"a guy... "still

hooking things up," to ask for the agent's beeper number, and to state
that he'd

give the number to the person

"still hooking things up,"

constituted the "facilitation of an illegal transaction" as charged, and
is grounds for discharge.
The allegation against the grievant, though technically a civil
or industrial offense in this arbitration, nonetheless parallels a crime.
Under that circumstance though the criminal standard of proof of "beyond
a reasonable doubt" is not applicable in an arbitration, the Company's
arbitral burden of establishing the grievant's culpability by evidence
that is clear and convincing, should be rigidly required.
I conclude that the evidence in the record falls short of
meeting that burden.
I agree with the Company that the grievant should not have
engaged the agent in conversation to the extent and in the manner he did.
The dialogue between them is suspicious and appears to have the potential
of leading to an illegal purchase and sale of a Company cable box. But it
falls short of consummation of an illegal transaction, and, so far as this
case is concerned, has missing from it one essential step or component
which would make it a "facilitation" of an illegal transaction.
There is no evidence that the unidentified person (named only as
a "fired" employee) ever contacted the agent or otherwise went forward
with the transaction.

So, as far as the record shows, no illegal purchase

and sale resulted from the conversation.
The missing link in my view between what was said and what would
complete the elements of a "facilitation of an illegal transaction" is

evidence that the grievant gave the "fired employee" the agent's beeper
number.
do so.

At the hearing, the grievant testified that he never intended to
Whether he testified truthfully is immaterial, as are his unknown

and unascertainable intentions, in the face of the absence of probative
evidence that the grievant did anything further with the beeper number.
The record indicates that the agent's beeper number was called
but that the caller(s) "hung up."

Obviously this is not proof that the

"fired" employee made the call or that it was because he obtained the
beeper number from the grievant.

The fact is that the agent gave the same

beeper number to several employees as well as to the grievant in the
course of his undercover activities.

So, any one of several employees or

others could have made calls, if any were made.
Manifestly, the grievant's conversation with the agent can be
construed, suspiciously, as a cooperative willingness on the grievant's
part to put the agent in touch with someone who would sell a black market
cable box.

Suspicion, however, is not enough to meet the test of "clear

and convincing."

Other interpretations are possible and reasonable.

What if the grievant had a change of mind, realizing that what
he might do would be illegal, criminal and grounds for discharge, and
decided not to go farther?

In the absence of any other incriminating

evidence of further illegal activity or intent, I could not construe that
circumstance
transaction."

as yet rising to the level of "facilitating an illegal
A "change of mind" is neither illogical nor unreasonable,

especially in light of the grievant's statement to the agent that "every
man"... (is) scared" and "they cut a few guys lose (sic)...for the same
thing, selling a box."
Also, again in the absence of evidence of further illegal
activity or intent, it is not wholly illogical or unreasonable to accept

the grievant's explanation that he "played along" with the agent, made
believe he was cooperating with him and "wanted to lead the guy (the
agent) on to no where."

Clearly that set of circumstances could not be

persuasively interpreted as "facilitating an illegal transaction."
This

is not

to

say

that

the

grievant

did

not

intend to

facilitate an illegal transaction, and it is not to say that he did not
take additional steps after the conversation to further the transaction.
Rather it is to say that the probative evidence is insufficient to prove
such conclusions clearly and convincing.
However, the grievant is not blameless.
engaged

the

agent

in the

conversation.

He

He should not have

should have stopped it

forthwith when he learned that the agent was seeking to buy a box.
Especially

so in view

of his acknowledgement that he was

expressly

instructed earlier by supervision "not to get involved" in such events,
and that he "knew it was wrong and could get him fired."

Also, I find

that he violated the Company's Code of Professional standards by failing
to report to management the agent's approach to him. The referred to Code
states:
"If

anyone

asks

you

to

do

anything

illegal,

immediately notify your supervisor and document the
incident in writing.

Forward documentation to your

supervisor."
Though this particular Code is among those listed under the
heading "General Conduct in Customer's Home," I am satisfied that its
purpose and intent applies to "anything illegal" (emphasis added) no
matter where in the employment setting it occurs, and not rigidly confined
to a "Customer's Home."

I conclude that the grievant knew of this Code or Rule and yet
failed to comply with it when the illegality of what the agent wanted to
do was so apparent.
Therefore, though I shall reinstate the grievant because the
oasic charge against him has not been proven by the requisite standard of
proof, I shall impose a disciplinary suspension for his failing to comply
with the Code of Conduct.
back pay.

Accordingly, his reinstatement shall be without

As he is being suspended for not complying with the Code, it is

immaterial that there may be other employees who were not fired for that
failure.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named parties, makes
the following AWARD:
The

discharge

of AMSLEY

disciplinary suspension.
without back pay.

GORDON

is reduced

to a

He shall be reinstated but

The period of time between his

discharge and his reinstatement shall constitute the
period of the disciplinary suspension.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

July 24, 1995

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)
ss:
)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
x

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION AND AWARD
The Port Authority Police
Benevolent Association, Inc.

CASE NO. 133000013-88

and
The Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey

X

The stipulated issue is:
Was the disciplinary penalty imposed on Police
Officer Brian Conroy for good and sufficient
cause? If not, what shall be the remedy?
Hearings were held on May 10 and June 14, 1994 at which time officer
Conroy, hereinafter referred to as "Conroy" and representatives of the abovenamed Association and Authority appeared. All concerned were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses. The Arbitrator's Oath was waived; a stenographic record of the
hearings were taken; and the parties filed post-hearing briefs.
Conroy is charged with violating Chapter 1, Paragraph 3, of Port
Authority General Rules and Regulations which reads inter alia:
"All instructions from supervisors, no matter how
transmitted or received, must be followed."
The single specification states:
SPECIFICATION 1 - On October 2,1985, at about 2115
while you were on duty at the Bus Terminal, you
disobeyed the direct order of a supervisor in that
you intentionally listed a charge on a Universal

-2-

Summons which you had been ordered not to use,
and did not list the charge you had been ordered
to use.
Previously, under the internal disciplinary procedures of the Authority,
Conroy was found to have committed the violation described in the
Specification. The penalty imposed was two days compulsory leave of
absence and an attendent loss of two days pay.
The Association grieves that determination. It is stipulated that this
arbitration is a de novo proceeding with respect to the charge against Conroy.
FACTS
On October 2, 1985, Conroy, a Port authority Police Officer, was on duty at
the Port Authority Bus Terminal. In the normal course of his duties, he took
one, Douglas Horton, into custody after discovering Horton smoking a marijuana
cigarette in a men's bathroom stall in the Bus Terminal. Horton flushed the
cigarette down the toilet. But a small amount of marijuana was found in
Morton's possession.
Horton was brought to the police area in the bus terminal and
handcuffed "to the wall" until an appropriate disposition could be made. Both
parties agree that based on the facts, two charges were available under the
penal law. Horton could have been charged with criminal possession of
marijuana, a misdemeanor based on his having smoked the marijuana, and
unlawful possession of marijuana, a violation, which does not include smoking
as an element of the offense.
The parties offer different versions of the events which followed.
Lieutenant Lawrence Fields, who on October 2, 1985, was a police sergeant
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serving as a tour supervisor at the Port Authority Bus Terminal, testified that
had encountered Conroy on October 2 when Conroy brought in Horton.
^ields acknowledged that Conroy also told him that Conroy had seen Horton
smoking a marijuana cigarette in the bathroom stall at the terminal as well as
laving found Horton in possession of a small quantity of marijuana. Fields
testified that he told Conroy to issue a summons charging "possession of
marijuana." Fields testified that Conroy expressed some concern about whether
the summons should be for "possession" or "criminal possession" of marijuana.
later testified that he told Conroy not to use a summons for criminal
possession.
At that time according to Fields, Sergeant Subrize, the desk sergeant who
was present, ordered Conroy to issued a summons for possession. Fields stated
that there ensued some further discussion about the amount of marijuana
involved (there was enough for about one cigarette) and the appropriate
charge. While Conroy was preparing the paperwork, Fields testified that he
leard Subrize again tell Conroy to charge Horton with possession of marijuana,
a violation, and not criminal possession, a misdemeanor. Later that evening, on
reviewing the paper work, it was discovered that Conroy had issued a summons
'or the misdemeanor of criminal possession of marijuana. Fields testified that
Subrize thereupon notified Horton that he had been insubordinate.
Sergeant Subrize did not testify. Neither side called him. He had retired
and no longer was with the Port Authority.
Conroy testified that when he brought Horton in, he had no discussion
with Sergeant Fields, and only had discussions with Sergeant Subrize
concerning the disposition of Horton. He testified that his discussions with
Sergeant Subrize related only to whether or not Horton should be arrested or
issued a summons and released. Conroy explained that he was concerned with
whether under the Police Department Instructions (PDI), Horton had been
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identified sufficiently to be released. Sergeant Subrize told him to issue a
summons and release Horton. Conroy asked to speak to the Tour Commander
pursuant to the PDI directive in cases involving this kind of disagreement (i.e.
whether to arrest Horton or to issue him a summons and release him.) Conroy
was not able to see the Tour Commander. Subrize told him to issue the summons
and Conroy issued a summons for criminal possession of marijuana. Conroy
insisted that Subrize told him simply to issue "a summons" and did not tell him
either not to issue one for criminal possession or to issue one for possession of
marijuana. According to Conroy, the only disputed issue between them was
whether Horton should be arrested or issued a summons and released. Conroy
asserts he obeyed Subrize's order which was to issue Horton a summons and
release him.
Conroy further testified that some time later that evening, an issue arose
concerning the absence of a voucher number which would have been required
for an on-line arrest and as to why there only was a summons number.
According to Conroy the qustion that evening revolved around the arrestsummons issue and no question was raised about the level of the offense
charged in the summons that he had issued.
According to Conroy, he first heard about the charge that he had
disobeyed an order when he was called into the Commanding Officer's office
during his next tour the following day. The Commanding Officer, Captain James
.omito, asked Conroy why he had not charged the lesser offense, i.e.. the
iolation, as he had been ordered. Conroy denied that he had been ordered to do

The only other evidence bearing directly on the events of October 2, 1985,
/as testimony by Captain Romito and Lieutenant O'Neill and the October 14,
985, handwritten memorandum from Sergeant Subrize to Captain Romito in
/hich Subrize apprises Romito of his view of the October 2, 1985 events and
"equests that Conroy be disciplined.

-5CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
The Authority claims that Officer Conroy disobeyed the orders of his
superiors to charge Horton in the summons he issued with the violation,
unlawful possession of marijuana, and not to charge him with criminal
possession of marijuana, a misdemeanor.
The Port Authority asserts that the order was lawful and proper,
transmitted by a superior to a subordinate. And that Conroy had a duty to obey
it.
The Union claims that Conroy did not receive the order he is accused of
disobeying. Alternatively, the Union contends that the order was neither
lawful nor proper. 1 The Union claims that because Horton's identity had not
been properly established, there was no authority not to arrest him under the
Port Authority's Police Division Instructions, and consequently the order to
issue a summons and release Horton was neither lawful nor proper. Moreover,
the Union claims that Conroy would have risked violating the penal law and
face disciplinary measures himself if he issued a summons for a violation when
the facts as known to Conroy constituted a misdemeanor.
As a disiplinary case, the burden is on the Authority to establish the
elements of the charge against Conroy by clear and convincing evidence. The
threshold question is whether Conroy disobeyed an order, as charged. Only if
he was given an order or an order was effectively transmitted to him does the
lawfulness or propriety of the order need be addressed. Similarly, a
prerequisite condition to disobeying an order is the neceesary finding that an
order was given.

Union points to the rule of conduct PDI 10-1(2) which states:
A member must promptly obey all lawful and proper
orders and instructions, written or otherwise, however
transmitted or received, (emphasis added)
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Based on the record before me, I conclude that the Authority gave Conroy
an order to "issue a summons," but the Authority has not shown clearly and
convincingly that Conroy was ordered to issue a summons for marijuana
possession, or was ordered not to use a summons for criminal possession of
marnuana.
The probative evidence as what transpired between Conroy, Fields and
Subrize, is ambiguous, offsetting and hence indeterminate.
Subrize did not testify to support Field's account of the events and his
(Subrize's ) role in them. Though Subrize is no longer with the Authority, it
has not been shown that he was unavailable to testify and if necessary, not
reachable by subpoena. In short, that he was not or could not be called as a
witness by the Authority on the critical question of credibility, was not
adequately explained. In the absence of his in-person testimony I cannot place
probative value on his memorandum which purports to describe events that
took place some 12 days earlier and which was prepared for the purpose of
recommending disciplinary action against Conroy. That memorandum in the
absence of the testimony of its author and the ability of the Association to crossexamine on its contents and preparation, is classic hearsay.
The same is true with regard to the testimony of witnesses Romito and
O'Neill. Neither had first hand personal knowledge of the events of October 2,
1985, so their testimony is hearsay as well.
That leaves the probative evidence to the divergent testimonies of Fields
and Conroy.
Significant to me in this regard is something that is not disputed. And
that is that Conroy obeyed Fields when told to release Horton (after the summons
was issued), even though Conroy thought that it was violative of rules and
procedures to do so (because he didn't think Horton was sufficiently identified),
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and even though Conroy wanted to appeal that decision to the Tour Commander,
rlaving obeyed that order, though he disagreed with it, I cannot comprehend
why Conroy would disobey another order with which he also disagreed, namely
an order to issue the summons for possession when he believed it should be for
criminal possession.
The inconsistency defies logic or reasonable explanation, unless, of
course, Conroy was not ordered specifically to issue a particular type of
summons or unless the order or its transmittal was unclear, indefinite or
ambiguous.
Indeed, the record does not disclose that Conroy was other than a
dedicated and competent officer. There is no evidence of any prior problem of
disobedience or insubordination. This is not to say that either Fields or Conroy
is not telling the truth as they remember it. They are both credible witnesses.
[ recognize, academically, that Conroy may have had an incentive to cast the
facts favorable to him, but I found his testimony to be straightforward and
impressive. Rather, it is to say that the testimony of both at the arbitration
involves their memories or an event of nine years ago concerning one or two
oral statements made at the time, the expression of which may not have been
precise, and the audible interpretation of which may have been different than
expected or intended respectively by those uttering them and those who heard
them, including the one to whom they were addressed.
Specifically, if Conroy was told simply to issue a summons or to issue a
summons for possession without being explicitly told that he should not issue
one for criminal possession, the language of such orders under the
circumstances is too incomplete or ambiguous to provide a basis for disciplining
Conroy for disobedience of an order to use a summons for unlawful possession
and not for criminal possession of marijuana. "Possession" could mean unlawful
or criminal possession or both, unless there is an explicit distinction. And of
course, a "summons" could apply to both types. Therein lies the ambiguity
which the offsetting and equally credible testimony of Fields and Conroy does

-8ot clarify.
Conroy's testimony that he was told to issue a summons and Fields'
testimony that Conroy was told to issue a summons for possession and or not to
issue a summons for criminal possession leaves unclear and ambiguous what
was intended, and importantly, what Conroy reasonably thought his
instructions were. In short, I am not persuaded by this record that the
communication between Fields and Conroy was sufficiently precise and explicit
to make clear to Conroy what he was to do and to foreclose a different, but
onest interpretation by him.
Finally, disobedience and insubordination are willful acts. A well
•ecognized element in proving either charge is the requirement to show that
:he offending employee knew his defiance was viewed by his superior as
lisobedience and/or insubordination, and more pointedly that if he persisted in
•efusing to obey, he would be disciplined.
Here, again based on the record and the conflicting testimonies of Fields
nd Conroy, I am not satisfied that it was made known to Conroy, until formal
charge against him were presented, that a failure to charge Horton with
possession rather than criminal possession constituted disobedience or
nsubordination and that he would be subject to discipline. Had the Authority
ompled with that well settled procedure, and assuming the accuracy of its
ontentions regarding what Conroy was ordered to do, I doubt that Conroy would
ave defied the order, especially since he had already complied with a part of it
ith which he had disagreed.
With the foregoing holding, it is unnecessary for me to deal with the
other Association defenses.
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The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator in the above matter
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named parties,
makes the following AWARD:
The disciplinary penalty imposed on Police
Officer Brian Conroy was not for good and
sufficient cause.
He shall be made whole for the two days pay
lost and the record of his compulsory leave of
absence shall be expunged from his record.

Eric J. Sfchmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: February 20, 1995
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York) ss.:
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator that I am
the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my
AWARD.
.•?

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the arbitration
between
Port Authority Police Lieutenants
Benevolent Association

OPINION AND AWARD
CASE NO. 13-300-00660-94

and
Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Port Authority violate the
collective bargaining agreement when
it failed to pay facility assignment
premium to Lieutenant Kevin Hassett
on June 24, 1993? If so, what shall
be the remedy?
A hearing was held on January 20, 1995 at which time
representatives of the above-named Association and Authority
appeared, as did Lt. Hassett, (hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant.)

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to

offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived; a stenographic

record of the hearing taken; and the parties filed posthearing briefs.
At the outset, let me narrow the issue before me.

The

Authority denied the grievant's request for the facility
assignment premimum (FAP) on a single ground.

Namely, that
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the grievant's assignment on June 24th, 1993 was "administrative."

Having expressly denied FAP on that single ground,

the Authority is bound to that reason in this arbitration.1
Accordingly, other reasons for the denial advanced by the
Authority in the arbitration or in its brief, are not cognizable by me.
The pertinent contract provisions are Article XVI Section
5, which reads:
Except as permitted by Paragraph 4
of this Section and by Section XIX
Paragraphs 8 and 9 hereof, any assignment of a Police Lieutenant to work
during a regularly scheduled tour at
other than his permanent facility
Assignment shall result in payment to
the Police Lieutenant of four hours of
pay at his straight time rate in addition to his regular pay for each full
tour. Notwithstanding the foregoing,
no payment shall be made pursuant to
this paragraph for any tour of duty for
which a Police Lieutenant is compensated
at overtime rates.
and Section 4 (c) which reads:
The practice of facility assigned Lieutenants reporting for interviews, medicals,
testing and administrative meeting shall
remain in effect without facility assignment change premium payment as set forth
in paragraph 5 herein. Mileage, carfare
or other payments, where applicable, shall
be made consistent with this Memorandum of
Agreement.

The grievant's commanding officer wrote the grievant:
"I have been advised that the meeting
that you attended at my request at Police
Plaza is considered "administrative" and
is an exception to the F.A.P. rule. As such
F.A.P. was not processed."
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Simply put, the issue is whether the facts in this case
fall within the "administrative meeting" exception in Section
4(c) to the provision for FAP set forth in Section 5.
I conclude that they do not.
On June 12, 1993 an Aviation Disaster Drill (involving a
mock airplane crash) was held at LaGuardia Airport.

The

grievant, whose permanent facility assignment was at JFK
Airport, was present at that drill as an observer, so assigned
by the JFK Command.
Various responsible agencies (NYPD, NYFD, Port Authority,
Department of Mental Health, Red Cross, Salvation Army)
participated in the drill.
On June 24, 1993, a meeting to "critique" the drill
was held at Police Plaza.

The grievant went to that meeting.

Based on the record before me, I find that the grievant's
presence at that meeting came about as follows:
1. Captain Brown, the Commanding Officer at LaGuardia
Airport called Deputy Inspector Frank Fox, the commanding
officer at JFK.

Brown told Fox that he (Brown) had a conflict

and could not attend the meeting and had no one else available
to attend.

Brown asked Fox if he had anyone who was at the

drill who could attend.
2. Fox asked the grievant to attend.

He instructed the

grievant to go to LaGuardia Airport, to see Brown.
3. The grievant saw Brown, and was instructed by Brown
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on what Brown wanted said at the meeting.
4. The grievant went to Police Plaza. There he reported
the views and positions of Brown and the LaGuardia command to
those attending the meeting.

He thereafter filed a report

with Fox, to which was attached a sheet listing those
attending.
Confined to the reason for the denial of FAP, it is the
Authority's position that as a "Training and Scheduling
Lieutenant" identified among the "Administrative Chart
Positions," the grievant not only occupied an administrative
job at JFK, but that his assignment on June 24th, was in an
administrative capacity.

And as such, the meeting he attended

at Police Plaza, in his administrative capacity, was
"administrative" in nature.

On this basis, the Authority

argues that the "administrative meeting" exception in Section
4(c) is applicable and that the grievant is not entitled to
FAP.
The Authority also connects the drill of June 12th and
the meeting of June 24th to the grievant's duties and
responsibilities in his "administrative" position at JFK.

It

asserts that he was an observer at the drill because, though
located at LaGuardia, the circumstances and procedures
employed at that drill would be applicable to any similar
actual plane crash at JFK, And that therefore observation of
the drill was instructive in handling a similar emergency at
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JFK, by personnel, under the grievant's supervision. The
meeting of June 24th to critique the drill was, concludes the
Authority, a follow-up on the grievant's observations and
designed to further his ability to act in the capacity of an
incident commander in a crash or major disaster at JFK of the
type simulated in the drill.
In short, the Authority seems to be arguing that what the
grievant learned from the drill and the subsequent critique,
educated him further in carrying out his duties at JFK, and
that I should conclude that that is why he was sent to both.
The contract does not define an "administrative meeting."
As I see it, the problem with the Authority's theories, is
that they are premised on the assumption that the grievant was
sent to the June 24th meeting as the representative of the JFK
Command.

He had been sent to the drill as a representative of

JFK (albeit, after he volunteered). If he had been sent to the
Police Plaza meeting again as a representative of JFK, there
may well be a basis to find that both constituted an
"administrative" function related to his "administrative"
duties at JFK.

But the record shows that he was not sent to

the June 24th meeting as a representative of JFK or even
representing Fox. On this point, Fox testified that but for
the request by Brown, neither the grievant nor anyone else
from JFK would have been sent to the meeting.

So the
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grievant was not sent to enhance his knowledge or his ability
to deal with a plane crash at JFK.

(That he may have

increased his knowledge and ability by attending, does not
mean that that was why he was sent.)
Indeed, the grievant's testimony that Brown told him
what to say at the meeting and that he stated Brown's views
and opinions of the drill and not his own, stands unrefuted.
Brown did not testify.
As such then, there is clear evidence that the grievant
was the representative not of JFK, but rather of LaGuardia
Airport, and particularly the representative of Brown.
That later the grievant filed a report with Fox, listing
those appearing at the meeting does not alter this conclusion.
I accept as logical, his explanation that he did so to confirm
with his commanding officer where he was on June 24th, and
what took place at the meeting.

I do not interprete it as an

admission that he was at the June 24th meeting as the JFK
representative or as part of his duties at JFK.
I need not decided whether the subject matter or
substance of the June 24th meeting was "administrative" or
otherwise.

I might have had to do so if the grievant had been

sent to that meeting as an official representative of the JFK
command.

I so find because I am satisfied that the exceptions

in Section 4(c) apply to the occurrence of those enumerated
circumstances while a Lieutenant is working in his regularly
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assigned capacity, and while assigned to

his regular

facility.
The 4(c) exceptions apply, as stated, to "facility
assigned Lieutenants." I interprete that to mean that if the
grievant, while working at and/or assigned to JFK, is sent
elsewhere as part of that assignment for an interview,
medical, testing or administrative meeting, he would not be
entitled to F.A.P.

Those events, under that circumstance,

would be part of his regular "facility assignment."
But June 24th was different. The grievant was not sent to
Police Plaza as part of his job duties at JFK, nor to enhance
his ability to handle a disaster, nor was he sent representing
JFK.

Constructively at least, he was detached from JFK;

assigned to Brown at LaGuardia, and subject to Brown's orders.
In short, he was not attending a meeting as a Lieutenant from
and on behalf of the JFK command, but rather, beyond his
regular assignment, from and on behalf of the Commanding
Officer of LaGuardia Airport.
I deem that to be an "assignment of a Police Lieutenant
to work during a regularly scheduled tour at other than his
permanent facility assignment" within the meaning of Section 5
of Article XVI of the contract.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator in the
above matter, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above-named parties, makes the following Award:
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The Port Authority violated the collective
bargaining agreement when it failed to pay
facility assignment pay to Lieutenant Kevin
Hassett on June 24th, 1993.
He shall be paid the facility assignment pay
pursuant to Article XVI Section 5 of the
contract.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
STATE OF New York)
COUNTY OF New Yorkjss:
DATE
May 8, 1995

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

x

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL 1505 AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD

and
RAYTHEON COMPANY
x

The stipulated issue is:
Did

the

relevant

Company

violate

provisions

of

Article
the

1 or

collective

any

other

bargaining

agreement by assigning non-bargaining unit personnel
to

perform

installation,

troubleshooting

maintenance,

repair

and

of the Ethernet Data Communication

System at its Missile Systems facilities recognized
under the collective bargaining agreement?

If so,

what shall be the remedy?
Hearings were held on January 17 and January 31, 1995 at which
time representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared and
were afforded

full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to

examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived, a

stenographic record of the hearings was taken, and the parties filed posthearing briefs.
The

Company currently

has two different types

of

Ethernet

networks in place at it's Missile Systems Division facilities which rely
on thick coaxial cables to transmit data.

The first type is a "private"

network which connects 60 to 80 factory test devices to a central factory
test equipment computer.

These factory test devices are

attached to the cable through the use of a tap box.

The tap box is a

connector which allows for data being carried on the central thick coaxial
cable to be tapped and transmitted

to the test device.

The work of

pulling the thick coaxial cable to the factory test devices, installing
the tap boxes on the thick coaxial cable and attaching the factory test
devices to the tap boxes is performed by Union members.
The other Ethernet network is a "public" network which allows
computers and intelligent work stations connected to various types of
cables to communicate with devices connected to other cables in the same
plant or in other plants.

The types of wires and cables used are (1)

"thick" coaxial cable; (2) "thin" coaxial cable; (3) fiber optic cable;
and (4) twisted pair wires.
The

Company

intelligent work

has

been

installing

personal

computers

and

stations on the "public" Ethernet network with non-

bargaining unit Data Techs performing all the work in question, except the
"pulling" of thick coaxial cable to the area where the tap boxes are or
are to be installed.
It is the aforesaid work on the "public" system now performed by
Data Techs and particularly the attachment of the cables and wires to the
tap boxes or other connectors, and the installation of those boxes and
connectors, that the Union claims is bargaining unit work.

The Union

asserts that the disputed work is "electrical," that it is "similar" to
work unit employees have regularly performed on the "private system and
elsewhere," is well within the skills and abilities of employees in the
Unit and by job description, contract definition and interpretation falls
within the Union's jurisdiction under the Recognition Clause (Article I)
of the collective bargaining agreement.

Specifically the Union claims that the work is "similar" to that performed
by bargaining unit Electrical Technicians A, and should be assigned to
that classification (or to other unit classifications referred to in the
record or to a new bargaining unit position).
The Company contends that the disputed work is not covered by
the Recognition Clause that it never has been performed by Union members,
that it is not "similar" to work performed by bargaining unit Electrical
Technicians

or

any

other

unit

employee,

that

"past

practice"

has

established the work as excluded from the bargaining unit, that bargaining
unit employees do not possess the skills, abilities or experience to
perform all aspects of the work including testing trouble shooting and
repairs and it would take years of training and experience to acquire the
skills that to Award the work to the Union, would be "featherbedding of
the worst kind," that because the system connects or interacts with other
systems operated by non-bargaining unit employees and because mistakes in
Safaefwitt.

performance of the disputed work could have "catatih.ajrgic" consequences
system-wide throughout the country.

It is managerially proper that the

disputed work he maintained by non-bargaining unit personnel.
Many of the positions of both sides I find to be immaterial.
What is essential and critical is whether the disputed work is bargaining
unit work within the meaning and coverage
(Article I) of the contract.

of the Recognition Clause

(That is the only section of the contract

relied on by the parties in this case) .

If so, the present skills,

abilities, experience, judgements and ingenuities of the bargaining unit,
especially the Electrical Technician A, are not determinative.

If the

work belongs to the unit, unit employees would have to be trained or hired
or transferred
assignment.

to the unit from the non-unit titles, to take on the

Similarly, if unit work, that unit employees may now be able

to perform the physical or mechanical work of installing taps or other
connector locations, but not now capable of handling the troubleshooting,
that repairs

or the evaluations that attend or may

follow the bare

installation or the connecting of wires and cables, does not remove the
work from the Union's jurisdiction.
Also, the potential damage from errors, the interfacing with
other

systems

or parts

of the

system

undisputedly

operated

by non-

bargaining unit personnel establishes no contractual basis to remove the
work from unit coverage.

Nor does a partisan, indeed cynical view that

unit employees are not as reliable, dedicated or efficient as non-unit
employees who have enjoyed several years of training on the disputed work,
change the Union's right to the work.
Conversely, of course, if the work is not within the Union's
jurisdiction
abilities,

as defined and intended by the Recognition Clause, the
skills,

qualifications

and

learning

capabilities

of unit

employees to do the work, does not bring the work within the coverage of
the unit.
Required

at

the

threshold,

and

determinative

is

an

interpretation and application of the Recognition Clause (Article I) of
the contract.
Article I in pertinent part reads:
The Company recognizes the Union as the sole and
exclusive collective bargaining agency with respect to
wages, hours and conditions of employment for all of
its employees in a unit described as follows:
All maintenance and production employees of
the

Comopany,

for

whom

the

Union

has

heretofore been recognized and all persons

who

may

become

apprenticed

to

job

classifications included in the bargaining
unit,

at

its

presently

Massachusetts plants

existing

in operation on the

date of this Agreement, including factory
clericals, but excluding (i) all employees
classified

as

Developmental

Machinists

Machinists

A,

Experimental

B

and

A,
C;

B

and
and

C;

Maintenance

Machinists; Die Makers A, B and C; Tool
Makers A, B and C; and Tool Grinders A, B
and

C;

and all persons who may

become

apprenticed to such job classifications;
(ii)

guards;

employees;

(iii)
(iv)

office

and

clerical

purchasing,

sales,

advertising, production control, scheduling
and

engineering

employees

(but

this

exclusion shall not apply to employees in
engineering
actual

departments

mechanical

and

regularly
electrical

doing
work

similar to work performed by production and
maintenance employees).

The parties recognize that material to that interpretation and
application in this case is the meaning of the phrase "employees in
engineering department. . .doing. . .electrical work similar to work performed
by

production

and

maintenance

particularly the underscored words.

employees,"

(emphasis)

added

and

So, what has to be addressed are the arguments and evidence of
the parties on whether the disputed work is "similar" to work performed by
production and maintenance employees, and whether it is being done by
"employees in an engineering department."
But for one important factor present in this case, but not
present or not substantially relied upon in the case before the Board of
Arbitration, Chaired by Arbitrator Mark Greenbaum, I would, as did he,
proceed to define the critical language of the Recognition Clause de novo.
And I would, as did Arbitrator Greenbaum, make subjective determinations
on their meaning and intent of the critical language.

Indeed, but for the

one factor, I would be confronted with the well-settled arbitral principle
that prior Awards between the same parties and under the same contract,
interpretation, the same contract language should be decided stare decisis
status

and

value, unless

"palpably wrong."

found by

the

subseguent

Arbitrator

to be

Mr. Greenbaum's reasoning and interpretation of the

meaning and intent of "employees of an engineering department" and the
factors that make up work that is "similar" cannot be deemed palpably
wrong.
However, what changes this, and which presents me with different
circumstances, is the evidence in the instant case of "past practice."
The Greenbaum decision notwithstanding, I find the Recognition
Clause ambiguous.
past

practice

In the absence of a significant amount of evidence on

in my

case,

I would

have submerged

my

view

of the

ambiguities of the Recognition Clause to the rules of according preeminence to a prior decision.

But, the Greenbaum Board, apparently did

not have before it the kind and quantity of past-practice evidence that
bore on the interpretation of the Recognition Clause, and therefore, quite
properly interpreted the Recognition Clause (and particularly the pivotal
terms) on the merits of the substantive evidence presented.
However, in the instant case, unlike I believe the matter before
the Greenbaum Board, I find that by past practice, the parties have
themselves interpreted the meaning and intent of "similar" and the meaning
and

intent

of

"employees

in engineering

department"

as

they

apply

specifically to the issue in this case.
As the parties well know, when confronted with ambiguities in
critical contract language, the Arbitrator resorts to past practice or the
negotiations history for classification. Here, no evidence of the history
of the negotiations of Article I, and particularly the pivotal words, has
been presented.
"Similar," asserts the Union relates to the similarity of the
mechanical or physical methodology of connecting wires and cables to tap
boxes or connecting points of both the "private" and "public" Ethernet
networks.

And that because bargaining unit electricians do the former,

they are entitled under Article I to the latter as well.
The Company views "similar" quite differently.

The disputed

work is dissimilar it asserts because the "public" system, unlike the
"private"

system

includes

sophisticated

testing,

troubleshooting and

repairs, and an impact from errors that is vastly more serious.

These

factors, the Company argues are just as much a part of the duties of the
disputed work as the mechanical wire and cable connections and tap box
installations.

Both

positions

are

plausible

and

logical

definitions

of

"similar" and hence the ambiguity.
Arbitrator

Mittenthal's

particularly helpful here.
comparing

of

jobs

for

definition

of

"similar"

is

not

He sets forth a formula of "elements" in

similarity

essentially the same view.

and Arbitrator

Greenbaum

expresses

But again, are the "elements" to be compared

confined to the mechanical work of connecting

the wires, or do they

encompass testing, troubleshooting, repairs and the impact of errors.
Arbitrator Greenbaum says that electrical work on an electsance
telephone system belongs to the bargaining unit even if performed by
employees from departments other than engineering

(i.e. in his case,

"cross wiring" by non-union technicians).
The

Union

adopts

and

advances

that

interpretation

of the

"engineering department" meaning in Article I in the instant case before
me.
But the Company claims that the clear wording "engineering
department" cannot be ignored; that it must have been negotiated for a
purpose; and that the purpose was to limit the scope of the bargaining
unit where electrical work was involved to when it was performed by
employees of an engineering department and not, as in this case if
performed by employees of another department; and that the job description
of the bargaining unit electrician contains duties creating electrical
"power," not duties related to a communications system.
Again,

as with

the

word

"similar"

both

interpretation

of

electrical work performed by "employees of an engineering department" are
plausible and defensible.

Hence the ambiguity.

With significant evidence of relevant past practice present, I
am constrained
Greenbaum

neither to confirm, adopt nor dissent from Arbitrator

interpretations, which, as I have said, he apparently and

understandably, made in his case without the presence or the compelling
precedent of past practice.
The practice is essentially undisputed.

It clearly shows that

the grievance was filed in 1992, but that since 1985 the Company was
assigning Data Techs to the disputed work, openly and with at least the
Union's constructive knowledge.

And that during that period, hundreds of

public network connections were made to tap boxes by non-bargaining unit
Data Techs, yet the Union did not complain or grieve.
Specifically the record before me shows that during the period
from 1985 Data Techs have installed tap boxes and in the public Thicknet
network; for eight years of that period connected coaxial cables on the
Thinnet public network; for five years of that period connected fiberoptic
cables to Ethernet hubs; for five years of that period connected or
punched down twisted pair wires and made jack installations on the public
Ethernet network.

And during the periods during which "thousands" of

connections were made by the Data Techs, they also carried out testing and
troubleshooting and repair duties.
The foregoing work and activities are what the Union claims in
this proceeding to be bargaining unit work.
All this means, based on well-settled arbitral rules, that in
the absence of complaints or grievances over an extended number of years,
when the work of the Data Techs was done virtually "side-by-side" with
IBEW members and extremely performed, the Union did not think it

"similar" to what the electricians or other bargaining unit employees did.
Nor, because the Data Techs were not part of an "engineering department"
they and the disputed work were not included within the bargaining unit
recognition.
This is not to say that I find employees of certain bargaining
unit classification, especially the Electrical Technician A, not capable
of performing the work.

I believe they have the skills presently to

perform the mechanical work of connecting cables and wires to tap boxes
and to installing these boxes and jacks.

Certainly, to my mind, if the

Electricians were accorded amount of training the Company gives to the
Data Techs, the Electricians possess the education, abilities and acumen
to learn and follow the training satisfactorily
troubleshooting and repair duties of the job.

perform the testing,

Indeed, my personal view is

that with their present abilities, their highly rated skills and top pay,
they'd be able to learn and perform the work after a reasonable period of
training and familiarization, and much sooner than the "several years" the
Company thinks would be required.
Rather, it is to say that by mutual conduct in the form of an
extensive past practice, from and during the nine year period from 1985 to
the filing of the grievance in 1992, the disputed work was not only
treated

as

exempt

from the Recognition

Clause,

but

by the Union's

acceptance or acquiescence the Company had reason to believe that it could
train and develop a corps of Data Techs for assignment to the work.

If

that is now reversed it would create operational dislocations for some
time until bargaining unit employees were adequately trained.
practice, accepted by the Union, precludes an arbitration Award
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The past

with that consequence, of course, negotiations between the parties for an
experimental program or phase in of bargaining unit employees to handle
the work or parts thereof are matters for the joint agreement of the
parties, and not for arbitration.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named parties, makes
the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate Article I or any other
relevant

provisions

of

the

collective

bargaining

agreement by assigning non-bargaining unit personnel
to perform

installation, maintenance, repairs and

troubleshooting

of the Ethernet Data Communication

System at its Missile System Facilities recognized
under the collective bargaining agreement.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

June 26, 1995

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.
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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 144 S.E.I.U.

OPINION

AND AWARD

and
Shore View Nursing Home

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge
of Felipe Foronda? If not, what shall
be the remedy?
A hearing was held on September 15, 1995 at which time Mr.
Foronda, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and Home appeared.

All con-

cerned were afforded full opportunity to ofer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's

Oath was waived.
The grievant is charged with physically abusing a resident
of the Home.
More specifically, the Home asserts that he willfully and
forcefully punched 82 year old John Simone in the left eye while
Simone was in bed.
The grievant denies the charge.

He and the Union on his be-

half argue that Simone fabricated the complaint in retaliation

-2-

against the grievant because the grievant did not get an
ambulance for Simone and send him to the hospital for "chest or
stomach pains" as Simone demanded. And that in general, Simone is
a chronic behavior problem who believes he is not getting enough
attention and is capable of making false claims against staff of
the Home whom he views as inattentive to him.
The parties recognize, I am sure, that this type of discharge
case is among the most sensitive and controvertial.

Manifestly,

the Home, the Union and the Arbitrator view patient abuse as
reprehensible in the extreme, and an inhumane act of monstrous
proportions.

A Home has the duty and the ethical and legal re-

sponsibility to safeguard its residents and patients, and to take
vigorous steps to prevent patient abuse by staff and to impose
severe punishment on any staff employee culpable of that offense.
Indeed, my view, which I am convinced is the overwhelming view of
arbitrators, is that physical abuse of a patient irrespective of
cause or provocation is intolerable and gounds for summary discharge .

-3-

The issue in this case is whether the grievant committed the
offense charged.

If he did, I would uphold the discharge, the

Union's procedural arguments regarding "progressive discipline"
and "double Jeopardy," notwithstanding.
Other than Simone and the grievant there were no witnesses to
the alleged assault.

The charge is based entirely on Simone's

complaint to Supervision.

The only other direct evidence is the

undisputed fact that Simone had a bruise under his left eye at the
time he reported the event and lodged his complaint.

The balance

of the Home's case is based on what Simone told Supervision, and
the Home's investigation after the fact.
Because of the compellingly sensitive nature of allegations
of patient abuse, because most often acts of abuse take place
without other witnesses, and because patients or residents are
essentially defenseless against assaults by those responsible for
their care, some arbitrators and authorities in the medical field
have urged a change in the burden of proof in these types of arbitration cases.

They have suggested that the complaints of the

patient/resident should be accorded a presumption of truth and
validity, subject to rebuttal by the employee accused and the

-4-

Union on his behalf.

Others have a more modified, but

nonetheless non-traditional approach.

They suggest that the

burden on the Home to prove the assault by "clear and convincing
evidence" be relaxed somewhat in recognition of the special
circumstances involved in the

nursing home or hospital setting

and the greater difficulty in that setting of meeting that
standard. Or in short, for both non-traditional views, if there is
to be an error in factual determinations, it should be on the side
of preventing and protecting against patient abuse by a more
liberal assessment of the evidence than proving guilt only the the
rigid "clear and convincing" evidentiary standard.
On the other side of this more liberal approach stands the
fundamental tenet of "due process," which its advocates argue
cannot be compromised.

To alter it for nursing homes or hospitals

is to open the door for modifications in other circumstances,
leading, dangerously, to its wholesale erosion with catastrophic
societal and legal consequences.

-5-

My view is that if the special circumstances of a nursing
home or hospital require or call for modifications in the traditional standards of due process in cases of alleged patient
abuse, those modifications should be negotiated as part of the
collective bargaining agreement (if there be one) or specially
enacted by legislation or administrative rulings.
Here, of course, the collective bargaining agreement contains
no such provision nor has any law or administrative regulation
been cited.
Therefore, though I understand and appreciate the Homes
vigilance and its prosecution of this case, the grievant's
discharge must stand or fall on whether the Home has proved the
charge and its obvious belief that the grievant is culpable by the
requisite standard of clear and convincing evidence.
I find that that standard has not been met.

It is of course

possible that because Simone was unreasonably demanding, because
he made incessant banging noises on the furniture, and broke up
chairs and other items to gain attention when dissatisfied with
treatment,the grievant, who was an aide caring for Simone, became

-6-

angrily exasperated, lost his temper and committed the physical
assault.

Simone's incorrigible behavior was testified to by

virtually all the witnesses.

But the step between Simone's

behavior and the charge that the grievant struck him, must be
proved by hard evidence and not left to "possibilities" or speculation.

Except for Simone's complaint and testimony, that hard

evidence is missing.
So the issue narrows to Simone's credibility.

And therein

lies the difficulties with these types of cases.
Simone was 82 years of age at the time of the alleged incident.

He had turned 83 when he testified at the hearing.

In

his testimony he displayed bursts of anger and a confrontational
attitude toward the nurses, nurses aides and orderlies of the
Home, expressed distrust and contempt for those staff employees,
and gave examples of how he believed he suffered inattention.
He was described by staff employees called as witnesses for
the Union as "evil" and "wicked."

They testified, that following

the grievant's discharge, he threatened one or more of them that
"he'd get them fired as he got (the grievant) fired.

I
j

They
•

testified that he often threatened them with false accusations.

!
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Simone testified that on the evening of January 8, 1995,
while he was in bed the grievant burst into his room and directed
several blows at him.

He said variously, that the grievant threw

"a dozen punches" at him; that the assault lasted "20 minutes to
1/2 hour;"
or that the grievant threw two or three punches at him, and that
he deflected all but the blow that hit him in the eye."

Yet at

the hearing, Simone could not identify the grievant, who was
present.
This is not to say that Simone's obvious exaggeration of the
events, or his general confrontational attitude, or his orneriness
with staff, or his exasperating and unreasonable demands, or his
inability to identify the grievant, means that he is lying.
Rather, under those circumstances in evidentiary terms, his testimony is not so reliable, not so believable or not so rational to
meet the required standard of "clear and convincing."
Simone did have a bruised eye.

Is that enough to conclude

that the grievant hit him? I think not. There are other plausible
possibilities that caused the injury.

That Simone could not

identify the grievant at the hearing may well have been due to his
claimed condition of "cataracts" and the other claim that he
couldn't recognize the grievant "out of uniform."

But other

-8-

conclusions are equally plausible, including a conclusion that the
assault did not happen and an identification of a falsely
accused employee could not, therefore be made.
Significant to my mind is that no other persons heard any
noise or commotion in Simone's room at the time of the alleged
assault.

Such an attack between 7 and 8 PM especially if it

lasted a while, would have produced outcrys for help by Simone and
those on duty should have heard them.

Based on his appearance at

the hearing it is obvious to me that Simone is capable of crying
out, shouting loudly and calling attention to any emergency in his
room.

Only after the alleged event did he say he "banged" for

attention, yet admits that other than the grievant "no one else
came to his room that evening."

It seems to me that one way or

another, such an incident would have generated an immediate and
dramatic verbal outburst and other noise from Simone which would
have brought someone into his room forthwith that evening.

The

report of the incident was made by a Miss Isaacs who went into
Simone's room the next morning, January 9th, and saw Simone's
bruised eye.

There is testimony, albeit hearsay, that in response
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to Isaacs inquiry about the eye, Isaacs told Patricia Pyle, the
Director of Nursing that Simone said he got it "horsing around
with Felipe."
Only later that day, when Pyle started an investigation, did
Simone accuse the grievant of the assault.
Again, Simone appeared to me to be a man who would have
complained loudly and demonstratively when the event happened
between 7 and 8 PM on January 8th, and attracted attention at that
time.

Certainly by the next morning, considering his

outspokeness, he would have reported it as an assault and not as
the result of "horsing around."
From this, again on an evidentiary basis, I cannot conclude
that either the "horsing around" or the assault took place,
clearly and convincingly.
For all the foregoing reasons, I do not find that the Home
has met its burden of proof.

With that conclusion I need not deal

with or detail why I disagree with the Union's arguments on "progressive discipline" and "double jeopardy."
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
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parties, makes the following AWARD:

There was not just cause for the
discharge of Felipe Foronda. He
shall be reinstated with full back
pay and benefits.
Of course in reinstating him the
Home, if it wishes, has the managerial right to assign him at a
location where he does not come in
contact with Mr. Simone.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: September 27, 1995
STATE OF
New York )
COUNTY OF New York )ss.:
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

-X

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
LOCAL 1115 HOSPITAL & SERVICE
EMPLOYEES UNION

AWARD
(WILKY ST. SURIN)

-andSYOSSET COMMUNITY HOSPITAL
-X

The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator in the above
matter, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the abovenamed parties, makes the following AWARD:
The three-day suspension of Wilky St. Surin was for just cause.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

December 19, 1995

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

... '"
M

from the desk of
GERARD SALVIO
Jan. 26, 1995

K
/

Dear Eric,*

x\jj

Thank you very much for getting your
award to us so soon.

The way you wrote

the award was one of the best explanations that I ever had the privilege
to read.
- Gerry

In the Matter of the Arbitration
- Between OPINION AND AWARD

LOCAL 702, I.A.T.S.E.
and
TECHNICOLOR EAST COAST, INC.

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the collective bargaining
agreement by putting a Supervisor in the Receiving
Department?
A

hearing

If so, what shall be the remedy?
was

held

on

January

10,

1995

at

which

time

representatives

of the above-named Union and Company appeared and were

afforded

opportunity

full

to

offer

evidence

and

argument.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
It
stipulated

is

undisputed

issue,

Robert

that
Marino,

the

Supervisor

performs

a

referred

significant

to

in

the

amount of

(bargaining unit work (about half his duties, the Company acknowledges) in
the Receiving Department, yet he is not a member of the bargaining unit.
The Union seeks an order directing that he be required to join
he Union, and be classified as a bargaining unit Receiver.
Two pieces of evidence clearly show that the Company and the
Union recognize that significant parts of the Supervisor's assigned duties
(i.e.

the

duties

bargaining unit.

of Receiving) fall within

the

jurisdiction

of the

The collective bargaining agreement expressly lists the

Receiver as a bargaining unit job within the Receiving Department.

I am

Dersuaded that the statement therein, "Receiver-limited to one man in
department"

means that what Receiving work there is to be performed exclusively by a
bargaining unit Receiver — though the Company may arrange the performance
of that work by assigning no more than one Receiver to do it.

It does

not, in my view, mean that non-bargaining unit employees may do Receiving
work, even if one bargaining unit Receiver is present as well.
This analysis is supported and re-enforced by the second piece
of evidence, namely an agreement between the Company and the then Union
business agent in 1987.

By letter dated April 6, 1987, Mr. Edward Beyer

of the Union agreed with Mr. Elio Pesato of the Company that one Robert
JMinnie "shall be reclassified as Customer

Service Supervisor, but be

allowed to continue to perform the same duties he currently is performing
as a customer serviceman."
It is undisputed that Minnie performed the

same duties as

resently performed by Marino and that those duties included bargaining
nit

work

as

a

Receiver.

pparently synonymous).

(Receiver

and

Customer

Serviceman are,

The impact of that letter agreement was to allow

innie to do Receiving work and still be a non-bargaining unit Supervisor.
Clearly that letter was a mutual recognition that the Receiving
ork to be done by Minnie was bargaining unit work, and that by agreement
of the Union, he was being excepted from bargaining unit membership and
coverage.

Obviously, without that agreement, Minnie would have had to be

in the Union.

Otherwise, there would have been no need for the letter

greement.
The instant issue is whether the Minnie agreement remains in
rorce and effect for Marino, who is a successor to Minnie in title and for
serformance of the disputed work assignment.

The

Company

relies

on the Minnie

agreement

as an ongoing

exception to the contract, and as a presently applicable and enforceable
"side agreement."
The present Union leadership asserts that it did not know of the
Minnie

arrangement;

that

it did not know

that

that

arrangement was

maintained during the incumbency of two successors to Minnie in the job,
(Messrs. Grovia and Samone) before Marino was appointed; that, if valid,
the Minnie agreement was limited to Minnie's incumbency and did not
perpetuate itself to his successor; and finally, in any event, as contrary
to the contract, the Union can now nullify it.
The Company is correct when it argues that "side agreements" are
as binding and enforceable as the contract itself.

I so held in my Award

of January 16, 1984 which the Company cites.
But the real question to be answered is whether the Minnie side
agreement is still applicable for enforcement or whether it expired with
the end of Minnie's incumbency.
The April 6, 1987 letter agreement is ambiguous.

Logically it

sould be limited to Minnie, and not intended to extend to his successors
in the job.

Or it could be interpreted

as on-going until or unless

hanged or terminated by bilateral agreement of the parties.

Hence, on

Its face, I cannot determine if it represents a continuing and enforceable
exception to the contract or whether it has expired.
Where a "side agreement" is relied on as a contract variation,
nd that side agreement is ambiguous, the burden is on the party asserting
Its

validity

imbiguousness.

and

enforceability,

here

the

The Company has not done so.

Company, to

clarify its

There was no testimony or evidence offered by either side on
whether the agreement was intended by its negotiators to be on-going and
o attach to the job of Supervisor —

Customer Serviceman, or whether it

as confined to the then person in the job, Robert Minnie, and only to his
ncumbency.
Absent that evidence, and without that clarification, I cannot
ustain

the Company's

contention

that the Minnie agreement is still

pplicable to and controlling for the Marino appointment.
What then is the status of the situation, and particularly the
mport of the incumbency on the job of the non-bargaining unit employees,
^rovia and Samone, following Minnie and before Marino.
those

incumbencies,

for

the

periods

I conclude that

involved, constituted

)ractice," that differed from the contract.

a "past

I find it was implemented by

the Company in the good faith belief that it was consistent with the
linnie agreement, and I also find that it was unknown to the present Union
leadership, albeit acquiesced in, constructively.
The arbitral rule in that circumstance is well settled.

A

•practice" inconsistent with the contract may be maintained so long as it
is agreeable to both the union and the employer. But, either party to the
contract may effectively and prospectively terminate a practice that is
contrary to the contract and require thereafter that the contract be
adhered to.
That is what the Union is doing in this case.

And in the

absence of persuasive evidence that the Minnie agreement was intended to
:arry over and apply to Minnie's successors, it has the right to do so.

Accordingly,
collective

bargaining

the Undersigned,
agreement

between

Impartial

Chairman

under

the

the above-named parties, and

laving duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the
ollowing AWARD:
The

Company

violated

the

collective

agreement by putting a Supervisor

bargaining

in the Receiving

Department.
The Company shall require that Supervisor to join the
Union and to be included in the bargaining unit; or,
alternatively the Company shall remove from his duties
any

and

all

Receiving

bargaining

unit

work

he

performs.

Eric J. Schmertz, Impartial Chairman

DATED:

January 20, 1995

TATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Impartial
Chairman that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.
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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OIL, CHEMICAL AND ATOMIC WORKERS
INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL 8-891

AWARD
DISCHARGE OF JAMES ATMORE

-andUNION CARBIDE CHEMICALS AND
PLASTICS COMPANY, INC.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Board of Arbitration in
the above matter, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said
parties, make the following AWARD:
There was

just cause for the discharge of JAMES

ATMORE.
Eric J. Schmertz, Chairman
DATED:

July

, 1995

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

ss:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Chairman
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

Cathy Hale, Concurring
DATED:

July

1995

STATE OF NEW JERSEY )

ss:
COUNTY OF
I, Cathy Hale do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Concurring that
I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which
is my AWARD.

Patrick O'Connor, Dissenting
DATED:

July

, 1995

STATE OF NEW JERSEY )
ss:

COUNTY OF

)

I, Patrick O'Connor do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Dissenting
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OIL, CHEMICAL AND ATOMIC WORKERS
INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL 8-891

OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
DISCHARGE OF JAMES ATMORE

-andUNION CARBIDE CHEMICALS AND
PLASTICS COMPANY, INC.

The stipulated issue is:
Was

there

ATMORE?

just

cause for the discharge of JAMES

If not, what shall be the remedy?

A hearing was held on April 11, 1995 at which time Mr. Atmore,
hereinafter

referred

to as the "grievant" and representatives

of the

above-named Union and Company appeared.
The Arbitration Board consisted of Mr. Patrick O'Connor, Union
designee, Mrs. Cathy Hale, Company designee, and the Undersigned as
Chairman.

The Oath of the Board of Arbitration was waived.

The parties

were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.

Post hearing briefs were filed, and

the Board met in executive session on June 26, 1995.
The parties entered into the following factual stipulation
(Joint Exhibit 3):

General

Background

Information

1.

Union Carbide Corp. has implemented a "Drug Free Workplace Program and Policy on
Substance Detection," [referred to as the "DFW Program"] which is attached as
Company Exhibit 1. The Union has no objection to the introduction of Company Exhibit 1.

2.

The DFW Program has three "phases." Phase I involves the pre-employment testing of
all applicants for employment. Phase II involves the testing of employees who are
suspected of being impaired at work. Phase III involves periodic non-discriminatory
screening of employees.

3.

Phase II of the DFW Program was implemented at the Bound Brook facility prior to
1993 collective bargaining negotiations between the Company and the Union. Following
the 1993 collective bargaining negotiations, the Bound Brook facility implemented
Phase III of the DFW Program.

4.

The Company has contracted with Human Affairs International ["HAI"] to administer the
rehabilitation aspects of the DFW Program, nationwide. HAI provides Employee
Assistance Program ["EAP"] and Coordinated Care services to employees enrolled in the
Company's medical program.
4.1.

Under the standard procedures agreed upon between the Company and HAI, when
an employee tests positive for a prohibited substance, the employee is referred to
HAI, which determines an appropriate course of treatment designed to
rehabilitate the employee so that he/she may return to the workplace.

4.2.

Under the Privacy and Confidentiality sections of the DFW Program, described at
pp. 6-7 of Company Exhibit 1, HAI shares with the Company only certain nonmedical information concerning the employee's participation in EAP, limited to
whether
•

Initial and Subsequent appointments have been kept (Yes/No);

•

A continuing course of treatment has been recommended (Yes/No);
The recommended course of treatment has been followed (Yes/No).

5.

Employees who have tested positive on a Phase II screening, have been referred to HAI,
and are enrolled in EAP counseling and rehabilitative programs considered appropriate
by HAI are required to cooperatively participate in such treatment programs as a
condition of continued employment.

6.

Employees who have tested positive, completed the initial phase of rehabilitation, and
are released to return to work receive a "Return to Work Letter" from the Company,
outlining the conditions of their continued employment, which includes complying with
all the terms and conditions of the treatment plan agreed to by the employee and HAI.

7.

Should HAI advise the Company that an employee has not complied with a recommended
course of treatment, such as by not attending counselling sessions, the Company
considers the employee non-compliant and subject to discipline up to and including
discharge.

Facts Pertinent

to This Grievance

8.

On Saturday, April 30, 1994, the Grievant tested positive for alcohol in a breathalyzer
test in a Phase II (Suspected Impairment) test. A urine specimen was obtained and
submitted for analysis and screening. The Grievant was taken home by Company security
personnel.

9.

On Monday, May 2, 1994, the Company's Medical Department contacted HAI to request an
appointment for the Grievant, in light of the positive test for alcohol. An appointment
was scheduled for that afternoon, and the Grievant attended the session.

10.

On Tuesday, May 3, 1994, Grievant was notified that he had tested positive for a
controlled substance, in addition to alcohol. HAI's EAR clinician scheduled a chemical
dependency evaluation at Carrier Clinic in South Plainfield, NJ for the next day, May 4.
HAI called Grievant to inform him of the scheduled appointment at Carrier.

11 .

Grievant attended the intake session at Carrier. Because additional information was
needed to complete the development of a treatment plan, a second appointment at Carrier
was scheduled for the Grievant for May 9. Grievant was called by HAI's EAP clinician to
inform him of the second appointment at Carrier.

1 2.

Grievant attended the May 9 scheduled session at the Carrier Clinic. The next day, May
10, HAI informed the Grievant of the treatment plan which had been devised, consisting
of intensive out-patient treatment. The treatment plan was to consist of 4 evening
sessions per week at Carrier Clinic.

13.

By the end of May, Grievant had progressed through the initial phase of the treatment
program, and HAI advised the Company that Grievant could be scheduled for a return to
work screening (substance and alcohol test). The results on that screen were negative
and a return-to-work conference with representatives of the Company and the Union
was set up for June 1 at 7:30 a.m.

14.

In attendance at the return-to-work conference on June 1 were the Grievant, Union
President Pat O'Connor, Bill Williams (peer counselor), Mike Santostefano (grievant's
second-line supervisor) and Dave Myers (Company Labor Relations). Grievant was
given a Return To Work Letter (Company Exhibit 2).

15.

On June 8, HAI informed Myers that Grievant had missed the scheduled evening session
on June 7, and further told Myers that when Grievant did attend sessions, he had not been
actively participating and did not appear to be making progress in his recovery. HAI sent
Myers a memorandum dated June 8 confirming Grievant's failure to attend the June 7
session (Company Exhibit 3). HAI also told Myers that it could no longer support the
Grievant's involvement in EAP.

1 6.

Later on June 8, Grievant's supervisor Santostefano met with Grievant and discussed
with him the terms of his Return To Work Letter.

17.

On Monday, June 13, Grievant missed a scheduled session at the Carrier Clinic.

18.

On Tuesday, June 14, HAI informed Myers of the Grievant's failure to attend the
counseling session the preceding evening, and that he had been discharged from treatment
for non-compliance. HAI followed up this verbal notification with a written
memorandum on June 15 (Company Exhibit 3).

19.

On Wednesday, June 15, a disciplinary hearing was held concerning the Grievant's
employment status. In attendance representing the Company were Myers and
Santostefano. Attending for the Union were Grievant, the Union Grievance Committee
(President O'Connor, as well as Carl Miller (Chief Steward), Bob Menango (Financial
Secretary), Rich Szabo (Vice President and Steward), and the EAP Committee Rep, Bill
Williams. At the hearing, Grievant stated that he had missed the outpatient meetings
because of repeated car trouble and a misunderstanding of the importance of attending the
meetings.

20.

On June 17, Grievant was terminated, effective June 16, for failure to comply with the
requirements of his return to work agreement.

It is the Company's contention that the foregoing facts
|
jiestablish the grievant's failure to comply with the requirements of the
ii
jjdrug rehabilitation program into which he was placed after he tested
I
jjpositive for drug use. The Company points out that under the specific
terms of the Program, and after he was expressly counselled and warned
'•[that he must strictly comply, the grievant missed treatment sessions and
was reported not to be progressing satisfactorily.
Those failures and violations, asserts this Company constitute
grounds for his discharge and meet the test of just cause.
The Union contends that the Company has not met its burden of
establishing just cause for the ultimate penalty of discharge.

It claims

that the grievant was not accorded Union representation when the terms of
the Program were explained to him; that he was not adequately impressed by
the Company with the necessity to attend all treatment meetings; that he
had to rely upon another person for transportation to the sessions, and he

missed treatment because of transportation problems; that his treatment
should have been "in patient" rather than "out patient"; that once the
Company deemed that he was to he disciplined, the discipline should have
been a suspension rather than discharge in accordance with the principle
of progressive discipline; and that the penalty of discharge imposed on
the grievant was disparate when compared to others similarly situated.
The

Company's

"Drug

Free Workplace

Program and

Policy on

Substance Detection" is not challenged by the Union in this proceeding.
Therefore, at least so far as this case is concerned, all the terms and
conditions
Union.

of the Program have been accepted or acquiesced in by the

The relevant terms are specific.
Paragraph 7 thereof reads:
"Should HAI advise the Company than an employee has
not complied with a recommended course of treatment,
such

as

Company

not

attending

considers

the

counselling

sessions",

the

employee non-compliant and

subject to discipline up to and including discharge."
(Emphasis added)
Here

it is stipulated

that the grievant missed

sessions and that HAI reported his lack of progress.

counselling

So those undisputed

and unchallenged specific terms were violated by the grievant.
These violations, by the very terms of the Program, constitute
a prima face case of just cause for discipline.
The trouble with the Union's case in defense of the grievant is
that it is not rooted in any contractual requirement, nor is it mandated
by the terms of the Program, nor was it presented to the Arbitration Board
in a probative manner.

The Union offered no direct testimony.
the grievant had transportation problems.

It merely asserted that

It merely asserted that he was

not adequately informed of the seriousness of missing counseling sessions.
It merely asserted that "in patient" treatment was preferable to the "outji
jjpatient" regime accorded him.
was treated

And it merely asserted that the grievant

in a disparate manner.

None of there

assertions were

supported by any testimony, by medical experts, or by other probative
evidence.

Hence they stand as bare allegations and cannot be accorded

evidentiary weight or worth, and cannot be deemed a probative defense.
Indeed, the record before me shows clearly that the grievant, by
memo and counselling, was told that full and strict compliance with each
aspect of the Program was necessary.

I am satisfied that he knew that to

miss counselling sessions and to be reported as "lacking in progress,"
would be fatal to his continuation in the Program and would subject him to
discipline "up to and including discharge." There is no evidence to rebut
or refute this.
Neither the contract nor the terms of the Program require Union
representation at stages prior to a disciplinary hearing. Hence, with the
acceptance of implementation of the Program, the Union also accepted the
fact that Company meetings with an employee in the Program regarding
compliance therewith could be undertaken by the Company without Union
representation.
representation.

Here,

in fact, the grievant did not request Union

And at the stage where Union representation is required

by law, namely at the point of discipline, the grievant had his Union
president and steward with him.

The Program does not set forth a requirement of progressive
discipline.

It gives the Company the option of imposing either a lesser

penalty or the penalty of discharge.
including

discharge"

means

suspension or discharge

just

The phase "discipline up to and

that;

namely

at the Company's

either

option.

a warning,

a

Depending on the

circumstances, by the specific terms of the Program, the Company is not
bound to impose a warning or suspension before discharge, but can select
the greater

penalty

disciplinary step.

for failure

to comply, without

an

intermediate

And again, with acceptance of the Program, and without

a challenge to it in this proceeding, the Union has accepted tacitly or
otherwise, that optional right of the company.
jithe

Company

did

accord

the

grievant

In fact, here, I find that
progressive

discipline,

I constructively. First, it placed him in a rehabilitation program rather
1
than discipline him when his drug use was discovered.
Then, after he
passed the initial stages of the Program, he was returned"to work.

Then,

'when he missed a counselling session and HAI informed the Company that it
wanted to drop him from the Program, the Company gave him another chance,
ijand directed HAI to continue him in the Program.

Only thereafter, when he

[missed another session, and the report of his failure to make progress was
reiterated, did the Company discharge him.
I deem the "second chance" given the grievant, after he missed
the counselling session of June 7th, to constitute a constructive step of
progressive discipline. Under the terms of the Program, the Company could
have

discharged

him

them.

By

not

doing

so

at

that

point

is

constructively tantamount to the warning and disciplinary import attached
to a suspension in the progressive discipline sequence.

Certainly the Company could have imposed a suspension rather
than a discharge.

That is not the issue.

right to select the greater penalty.

The issue is whether it had the

Under the terms of this Program, it

had that right.
In light of the specific authority for such a penalty expressly
set forth in the Program, the penalty of discharge should be reversed only
if found to be capricious, arbitrary or discriminating.
Here,

considering

the

terms

of

the

Program,

the

express

instructions he received when placed in the Program, the "second chance"
given him, and

the

absence of

any probative or direct evidence of

mitigation or disparate treatment, I cannot find the Company's imposition
of the penalty of discharge to be arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory.
Accordingly, it is upheld.

Eric J. Schmertz, Chairman
DATED:

July

, 1995

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss:

COUNTY OF NEW YORK )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Chairman
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.
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IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT
WORKERS UNION -and- WHITE PLAINS BUS
COMPANY, INC.
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION AND AWARD
.OCAL 100, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION

-andWHITE PLAINS BUS COMPANY, INC.

The stipulated issue is:
Was

there

Ciapetta?

just

cause

for the discharge

of Maria

If not, what shall be the remedy?

A hearing was held on November 27, 1995 at which time Ms.
iapetta, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of
the above-named Union and Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded

full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross
examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The Company seeks two determination in this proceeding.

First

that it may discipline bus drivers for accidents that are "preventable,"
whether or not legally "chargeable."

And second, the affirmation of the

discharge of the grievant.
The first question was not joined in my prior decision (Martin
J. Araoz November 9, 1994) because in that case the Company deemed the
terms "preventable" and "chargeable" to be synonymous.

In the instant

case it asserts that the two accidents and two incidents in which the
grievant was involved were "preventable" on her part, and regardless of
whether

they

discipline.

were

also

"chargeable,"

their

preventability

justified

Let me deal first with the concept of "preventability" as a
>asis for discipline,

without connection to the facts in this

case.

Though the Union takes no particular position on the concept, asserting
instead that this case is limited to whether there was just cause for the
grievant's dismissal and arguing more particularly that the penalty of
discharge was "too harsh," I conclude that an answer to the conceptual
question is within my jurisdiction as the Impartial Chairman.

And that

for purposes of guidance and contract interpretation the parties should
lave an answer.
In my judgement "preventability11 has within it the elements of
negligence, or omission of a required act, or commission of a proscribed
act or the exercise of other unsafe methods or procedures.
an accident would have been prevented

if the operator

In short, if
had not been

negligent or had not failed to act as required, or had acted wrongly or in
an unsafe manner, then the accident may be deemed "preventable" and the
operator disciplined.

Put another way, if the accident was due wholly or

in significant part to the aforesaid negligence, omission or commission by
the operator, the operator is culpable of unsafe driving and subject to
discipline.

The facts of any such accident may or may not coincide with

the test of legal liability or chargeability.
I have repeatedly held that a bus company, transporting the
riding public, has a "fiduciary" duty to exercise care and to operate its
buses in a prudently safe manner.

And that it may discipline and sever

from its employment drivers who, as the Company's agents, do not meet that
required standard.
fatal

or

major

I have also held that the employer need not await a

property

damage

prosperity for accidents is shown.

accident

to

take

that

step

when a

That takes us to the facts in the instant case.
has been employed as a bus driver for about 31/2 years.
that she has been trained, retrained and instructed

The grievant

It is undisputed
in the rules and

procedures of bus driving under the law, the National Safety Council
Guide, and has completed the Council's course in Defensive Driving.
Prior to the accident which triggered her discharge she was in
a minor accident in the garage in 1992 when she backed into a parked car;
an incident in April 1993 when she slid off an exit ramp from a highway
onto the grass siding with two school children aboard; and was cited by
the Company for "driving too fast" in June 1993.
incidents

she

respectively

received

a

For those accidents and

"Notice

of

Determination

of

Preventability," a two-day suspension and retraining, and another two-day
uspension.

Her

last

accident, on September

13, 1995

was

serious.

Driving a Company van, she back ended a car in front of her causing
considerable damage to the car1 and some damage to the van.
Based on the record before me I deem that all four, with the
Dossible exception of the first, were preventable if the grievant had been
properly

careful.

Though

the

Union

was

not

then

in a

collective

bargaining relationship with the Company and therefore unable to represent
her in regard to any but the last accident, there is no denial in this
proceeding of the charge in 1993 of driving too fast.

The evidence

adduced concerning the incident where she slid off the road persuasively
shows that she exited the highway at too fast a speed for the wet and
slippery conditions then present, and that her excessive speed caused her
vehicle not only to slide onto the grass siding but to became caught in

'The undisputed evidence is that the car was "totalled."

3

mud requiring a tow truck to be pulled out.

No other explanation but

excessive speed is plausible for that consequence.
claim that the "brakes locked."

I must reject her

Even if that were so, it is evidence of

excessive speed.
The first incident may not have been her fault and may not have
been preventable on her part.
another employee.

She was being directed in the maneuver by

The direction may have been faulty and she may have

relied on faulty instructions.
However,

the

September

13,

>reventable, but also probably chargeable.

1995

accident

was

not

only

At a double intersection with

a double set of stop lights, the grievant testified that she was stopped
at the first light directly behind a private car, also stopped at that
light.

What happened there after is unclear, except that the grievant's

explanation

is

both

implausible

circumstances are not precise.

and

unbelievable.

The

actual

But the expert testimony adduced by the

Company point to the grievant's negligence under any plausible set of
facts.
The grievant claims that when the light turned green the car in
front proceeded.

She waited five seconds and followed.

She states that

when the car in front passed under the second traffic light which also was
green, it stopped abruptly and unexpectedly, and she ran into it.
Based on the evidence I cannot believe that the private car
stopped as the grievant claims, nor can I believe that the extent of the
damage to the car would have been so severe unless the grievant failed to
stop at the first light, or was following at an excessive rate of speed,
or was following too closely, or not otherwise paying attention to the car
ahead of her.

These errors on her part add up to a preventable accident

which would not have occurred or not so seriously but for those errors.

